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Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of a plant or animal disease with the
goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death. After the 2002 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center, the security of the food supply is of increasing
concern to the United States. A major incidence of agroterrorism or food tampering
would have far reaching impacts on the economy and public health. The first objective of
this project was to determine knowledge and concern of agroterrorism in meat processing
facilities in Kentucky, and to determine knowledge and concern of food tampering and
food defense in food service establishments in Warren County, Kentucky. The second
objective was to determine security strategies that were being implemented by these
facilities. Two separate surveys, one for meat processors and the other for food service
establishments, were designed to meet these objectives.
An observational study was conducted for meat processing facilities. It was
found that these facilities were generally unconcerned with agroterrorism, although a
reasonable amount of security implementations were in place at these facilities. A
statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurant food service
establishments, such as schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed. Both types of food
service establishments expressed little concern about a food tampering event. Non-
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restaurant food service establishments were slightly more concerned than restaurants
about both food tampering and food defense.

x

Introduction & Background
Introduction
This project had two primary goals. The first was to determine how meat
processors in Kentucky feel about the likelihood of an agroterrorism event and what
prevention and security strategies were being implemented in these facilities. The second
was to determine the knowledge and concern of managers in food service establishments
about food tampering and food defense and what security strategies were being employed
in their establishments. Agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of a plant
or animal disease with the goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.1
Agroterrorism is considered a subset of bioterrorism, so this review begins with an
introduction to this concept and follows with a description of agroterrorism and factors
that make agroterrorism unique from other types of terrorism events. It concludes with a
review of food tampering in food service establishments.

Bioterrorism
According to the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a
biological attack, or biocrime, is considered “the intentional release of a pathogen or
biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”2 Biocrimes can be further subdivided into
bioterrorism related events and non-bioterrorism related events.3 For the purposes of this
review, Carus’ definition of bioterrorism will be used. Bioterrorism is defined as the
threat or intentional use of a biological agent against a person or group for ideological
reasons, which include those crimes that are politically, ecologically, or religiously
inspired.4 A non-bioterrorism biocrime is defined as the threat or intentional use of a
biological agent against a person or group for personal profit, such as those crimes that
1

are committed for personal revenge or for monetary gain.3 Bioterrorism, in general, is
considered a low-incidence, high-impact event.4 Essentially this means that, although the
total number of bioterrorism events is modest, the potential health and economic impacts
of a single event could be devastating. For this reason, it is critical that resources be
devoted to the prevention of such an attack.
Fortunately, there have been few documented instances of bioterrorism in the U.S.
Information concerning terrorist attacks that have occurred worldwide from 1970 to
today can be accessed on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Currently, the GTD
contains more than 98,000 instances of terrorism.5 Of these, only 25 documented the use
of biological material as a weapon. Nineteen of these 25 instances of bioterrorism
occurred in the U.S.5 Each case is described in further detail below.
•

The first cases occurred in 1984 in The Dalles, Oregon. A religious
extremist group known as the Rajneeshees poisoned local restaurant salad
bars with Salmonella typhimurium (S. Typhi), which is a bacteria that
causes salmonella food poisoning.4 Four of the 19 cases of bioterrorism in
the U.S. are attributed to this group. Three cases of S. Typhi poisoning by
the Rajneeshees resulted in injury.5 A total of 778 people5 were injured in
these attacks, including 45 hospitalizations.4 No deaths were reported.
The Rajneeshees were attempting to temporarily incapacitate people in
order to prevent them from voting in an upcoming election.4

•

The second occurred in 2001. Letters containing spores of the bacteria
Bacillus anthracis, otherwise known as anthrax, were mailed to several
news media outlets in New York and Florida and two U.S. Senators.6 The
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first letters were postmarked one week after the September 11 attack on
the World Trade Center in New York City.6 The first case of inhalational
anthrax was identified on October 4, 2011.7 The remaining letters were
postmarked on October 9, 2001. In total, 22 people were infected with
anthrax, including five deaths.6 The scope of this case is relatively small.
However, it is estimated that the total economic cost of the outbreak,
including clean-up costs for contaminated buildings, was more than $1
billion.8 It is estimated that a mass bioterrorist attack could cost anywhere
from $200 billion into the trillions.9
•

In 2003, a letter containing ricin was mailed to both the United States
Department of Transportation10 (DoT) and the White House.11 Both
letters were discovered in postal facilities prior to their final delivery
destination. Both letters had the words “caution RICIN POISON
Enclosed in sealed container Do not open without proper protection” on
the outside of the envelope.12 Enclosed in each envelope was a metal vial
containing ricin and a letter. The writer of the letter claimed to be an
owner of a trucking company that was unhappy with new federal
regulations regarding truck driver hours of service. He/she claimed to be
able to produce large amounts of ricin, which the writer was planning to
use if the new laws were not repealed. The writer signed each letter with
the moniker “Fallen Angel.”12
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•

On February 2, 2004, the office of senate majority leader Bill Frist was
delivered an envelope containing ricin. The sender was never discovered.
No injuries were reported.13

•

In 2005, anthrax was discovered in a mail facility in Arlington, Virginia.
One hundred people received antibiotic treatment as a result of this
incident, but no casualties were reported. No responsibility was ever
claimed for this incident.14

•

The final incident occurred in 2010. Members of an animal rights group,
known as the Justice Department, sent razor blades they claimed were
contaminated with AIDS-infected blood to two employees of the
University of Los Angeles in California.15 The group was threatening
these employees for their work on animal research involving primate
vivisection. Although the razor blades contained blood, the presence of
AIDS was never confirmed.16

Since much damage can be caused by one bioterrorism event, it seems fortunate
that few attacks have occurred on U.S. soil. It seems especially fortunate given that
evidence has been documented proving that terrorist groups present in the U.S. have been
discussing the use of biological weapons since the 1960s.4 Several examples are listed
below. This list is by no means exhaustive, and many other incidents are documented by
Carus in his working paper entitled Bioterrorism and Biocrimes.4
•

In 1972, a white supremacist organization in Chicago known as R.I.S.E.
was found with possession of S. Typhi, the organism that causes typhoid
fever.4 The group was planning to contaminate the city’s water supply in
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an attempt to kill people. The members of the group described themselves
as “inoculated,” so that they would survive the outbreak. The surviving
members of the group would then be the base for a new “master race.”17
•

In 1974, a safehouse operated by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)
was discovered to contain, among other items, a book entitled “Germ
Warfare.” There was no evidence found to suggest that the SLA ever
developed the ability or means to commit acts of biological terrorism.18

•

In 1992, four members of a group known as the “Patriot’s Council” were
found in violation of The Biological Weapons and Antiterrorism Act of
1989.19 These members were involved in a plot to bomb a federal
building4 and murder a sheriff’s deputy and a U.S. Marshall with the
toxin, ricin.19 One member was found in possession of the ricin they were
planning on using.4

•

In 1998, three men, all members of a Texas separatist organization, were
arrested for threatening to use biological weapons against key members of
the U.S. government and their families.20 Threats were sent to former
U.S. president Bill Clinton, former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, and
the director of the U.S. Secret Service, among others. The men were
found with devices they were developing for the purpose of injecting
biological material into victims. No materials for use in biological
weapons were discovered, however, it was found that the men were
planning to manufacture botulinum toxin with a mixture containing rotten
chicken meat, dirt, and green beans.20
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•

In 1999, an Egyptian extremist military group known as the World Islamic
Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders was reported to have biological
weapons. The report noted that the group planned to use the weapons
against targets in the U.S. and Israel. The possession of biological
weapons by this group was never confirmed.4

While bioterrorism events remain few in number, agroterrorism events are fewer
still. There are only a handful of documented agroterrorism events that have occurred
around the world. This is fortunate; however, it may have the unfortunate consequence
of luring the population into a false sense of security. The discussion will continue with a
description of agroterrorism and some unique factors that make it both simple to
accomplish and potentially devastating. The next section reviews the published literature
on agroterrorism.

Agroterrorism
Agroterrorism is a relatively recent term and only came to be studied in earnest in
the late 1990s.21 It was a term developed to describe the deliberate introduction of a plant
or animal disease in order to cause fear, economic devastation, illness, or death.1 To
summarize this concept further, agroterrorism is terrorism against agriculture.
Agriculture includes animal and plant husbandry, as well as the cultivation of any other
product intended for human consumption.22 The World Fact Book, published by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), estimates that agriculture consisted of 1.2% of the
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 and 0.7% of the U.S. labor force in 2009.23
In 2011, meat production contributed $84.9 billion to the U.S. economy.24 These
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numbers seem to imply that agriculture does not represent a significant portion of the
economy. However, the food and fiber system, which includes agriculture and any
activity which utilizes agriculture products, supplied 11% of the GDP and 16% of the
labor force in 2002.1 Due to the heavy influence it has on public health and the economy,
agriculture falls under the definition of critical infrastructure.
In the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Section 1016(e), critical infrastructure was
defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of these matters.”25 This definition is very apropos in a discussion of the
potential impacts an agroterrorism event would have on the United States. The 2009
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) lays the foundation for the federal
government’s role in infrastructure protection. In section 2.2.2 of the NIPP, the bulk of
the responsibility for agriculture protection is assigned to the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).26 These agencies
and others have a number of policies in place to protect agriculture, although food
defense plans continue to be voluntary.27
In general, agroterrorism is not considered to be the primary choice for a typical
terrorist.1 Agroterrorism does not usually involve immediate human casualties, and it
does not have the shock factor that many other methods of terrorism employ. In addition,
it is often difficult to identify the source of an outbreak, whether it is started deliberately
or accidentally. Thus, an agroterrorism event may be incorrectly labeled as accidental,
and the perpetrator will never receive credit unless he/she comes forward.1 Although this
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may explain why there are few incidences of agroterrorism, it is not a topic that should be
ignored. In 2002, right after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center in New York City, hundreds of pages of documents were discovered in Al Qaeda
hideouts indicating that this group was interested in committing acts of agroterrorism
against the U.S. and had documented plans to accomplish this task.28 In addition, there
are aspects of an agroterrorism event that make it extremely difficult to prevent and
contain. As the focus of this portion of the project is meat production, this discussion
will be focused on the difficulties of securing livestock and meat processing facilities.
Firstly, the majority of livestock on farms are stored on large open pastures that
are difficult to secure against intruders.1 Nearly one-quarter of U.S. land is devoted to
grazing land for livestock.29 This amounts to approximately 525 million acres of land29
that is widely spread across the U.S. Securing such a large land area is a daunting task.
Furthermore, the livestock on these farms are often sent away for slaughtering, packing,
and processing, widening the spread of infection. In general, a pound of meat travels an
average of 1,000 miles before it is consumed.21 Once present in slaughtering facilities,
the livestock are contained in confined, and often overcrowded, areas. Confining animals
in enclosed spaces increases the likelihood of spreading disease.1
Secondly, there has been a widespread eradication effort by the U.S. against
animal diseases. Several complications have arisen as a result of this. First, the same
effort at eradication has not been made in many other countries. This means that many
animal diseases, although not prevalent in the U.S., are endemic to other countries.1 This
gives potential terrorists easy access to certain diseases. Second, veterinarians, who are
generally considered the most trusted source of advice on sick animals,27 often have
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never seen cases of certain animal diseases and may have a difficult time recognizing the
signs and symptoms.30 This may result in a large amount of time passing before
realization that an attack has occurred. Third, livestock have been subjected to overuse of
antibiotics, resulting in increased bacterial resistance to multiple drugs.30 This may make
it more difficult to treat livestock that have become contaminated with a bacteria.

Documented Incidences of Agroterrorism
There are very few documented incidences of agroterrorism. This section will
examine cases occurring after the year 1900.
•

The first documented cases of agroterrorism in the 20th century occurred
during World War I, when Germany targeted horses and other livestock of
various Allied countries.21 The first instance of this took place in 1915.
The specific targets were horses and mules that the U.S. was planning to
take overseas to its military in Europe. German agents attempted to infect
these animals with Burkholderia mallei bacteria, known for causing the
disease Glanders.5 This disease is highly contagious among horses,
donkeys, and mules but is only seen sporadically in other species of
animals.31 Very few human cases have been reported among people
working closely with infected animals, however, no human-to-human
cases have been documented in the U.S.32 It is unclear if the initial
attempt was successful.21 Similar attempts by Germany were conducted
between 1915 – 1918, targeting the U.S., Romania4, Spain, Norway,
Argentina, and France.21
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•

In 1952, an agroterrorism incidence occurred as part of the Mau Mau
uprising in Kenya.21 The conflict centered around an anti-colonial
military group, known as the Mau Mau. This group was responsible for
the poisoning of 33 head of cattle belonging to citizens of a British colony
in Kenya. The Mau Mau used a toxin found in African milk bush,
resulting in the death of eight of the poisoned cattle. The British believe
that this was one of many attacks targeting livestock by this group,
although documented evidence of this is poor.4

•

In 1979, a massive outbreak of anthrax occurred in Zimbabwe. It is
postulated that a Rhodesian military group deliberately infected cattle with
the bacteria, however evidence for this theory is circumstantial at best.33
The deliberate nature of this attack has never been confirmed. Carus
states that although responsibility for this attack has been publicly
associated with nationalist guerillas, this may be nothing more than
Rhodesian propaganda.4 As a result of this outbreak, more than 10,000
people became ill, including 182 deaths.33

•

In 1985, Carus reported a possible instance of agroterrorism among
Mexican workers employed to remove screwworms from livestock. The
workers may have deliberately infected the livestock with screwworms in
order to keep their jobs. However, the only evidence for this appears to be
a statement from a USDA official, and the attack was never confirmed.4

•

In 1997, New Zealand farmers introduced rabbit hemorrhagic disease
(RHD) in an effort to control the feral rabbit population.33 The perpetrator
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of the initial attack was never found, although some farmers did admit
contributing to the further spread of the disease. RHD is not transmissible
to humans.4

Potential Economic Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event
While the global incidence of agroterrorism remains low, there is enough
evidence from other, non-deliberate agricultural crises to indicate that the economic
burden from a single act of agroterrorism would be extremely costly. In Belgium during
the year 1999, animal feed became contaminated with the chemical compound, dioxin.
Meat production in the Netherlands was significantly impacted with an estimated cost of
more than $493 million.34 In Canada, a minor outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease
occurred between 1951 and 1953. As a result, approximately 2,000 head of cattle were
destroyed. The direct cost of this for Canada was $2 million. However, the outbreak
caused the value of Canadian livestock to decrease, resulting in the loss of $650 million
in beef exports.35 Using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, a $650 million loss in 1951 would be approximately a $5.8 billion loss
in 2012.36 In a study published in The Journal of the American Veterinary Medical
Association in 2002, the estimated cost of a major outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in
the U.S. may be upwards of $14 billion.37

Potential Public Health Impacts of an Agroterrorism Event
The public health burden in an agroterrorism attack can be viewed in multiple
ways. First is the impact on food production. In 2011, the U.S. produced over 49 billion
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pounds of beef, hog, and sheep meat products. Approximately eight billion pounds of
these meat products were exported to other countries. Approximately 4.5 billion pounds
of meat products were imported from other countries.38 In total, the U.S. produced and
imported 45.5 billion pounds of beef, hog, and sheep meat products meant for
consumption. Given the current United States population of approximately 300 million39,
if all this meat was consumed and none wasted (a fairly unlikely outcome), this would
amount to approximately 152 pounds of meat per person per year. The 2010 Dietary
Guidelines for Americans published by the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and the Unites States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
publishes a range of recommended calorie intake of 1600 – 2400 calories for women and
2000 – 3000 for men, dependent upon the level of physical activity.40 For the purpose of
this analysis, it will be assumed that the average American needs 2,000 calories per day
to maintain a healthy weight. In one year, a healthy American should consume
approximately 730,000 calories. Although different types of food contain differing
amounts of calories per pound, it is generally assumed that there are 3,500 calories per
pound.41 Therefore, in one year, a healthy American should consume approximately 208
pounds of food. If a healthy American consumes 152 pounds of meat per year, nearly
75% of his/her diet would be meat products. This is a bit extreme, however, even if it is
assumed that 10% of a healthy American’s diet is meat products, a major agroterrorism
event could potentially result in a deficit of 20 pounds of food per person per year.
The second impact on public health that may result from an agroterrorism event is
the transfer of disease between animals to humans. This type of disease is known as a
zoonotic disease. The problem of containing zoonotic disease is an ongoing one. Nearly
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75% of new emerging diseases are considered zoonotic. Approximately 62% of known
diseases in humans have come from an animal source.42 One of the more familiar cases
of a zoonotic disease pandemic is the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak
in the early 2000s. This disease affected more than 8,000 patients, including 916
deaths.43 The World Health Organization (WHO) published a fatality rate of 0% to 50%
that was highly dependent on the age of the patient.44 Public health agencies all over the
world were on high alert, and it caused widespread global panic. The Hong Kong
Department of Public Health issued a quarantine of a small street block containing 264
apartments. More than half of the residents of these apartments were not home at the
time of the quarantine, implying the spread of the disease was continuing. Police
presence was required to keep the remaining residents from violating the quarantine
order.45 This scenario illustrates the difficulty for public health departments everywhere
to contain an epidemic. As the number of cases increase, quarantining the infection
becomes more and more impossible and the economic cost continues to escalate.45 In a
study on the role of law enforcement in an agroterrorism event, it stated that police
presence may be required to enforce quarantine for up to 60 days following the outbreak
of a foreign animal disease.46

Food Tampering
The subject of the second portion of this project was food service establishments.
To discuss food defense for these establishments, the focus must shift from a large scale
form of attack, such as agroterrorism, to a smaller scale form of attack, such as food
tampering. Food tampering is defined as the deliberate contamination of food with the
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intent to cause harm. Food tampering can be caused by an employee or former employee
of the establishment.47 An example of this occurred in a supermarket in Grand Rapids,
Michigan on December 31, 2003.48 This particular supermarket was forced to recall
1,700 pounds of ground beef after 111 people fell ill with nicotine poisoning.49 It was
discovered that an employee of the supermarket had deliberately contaminated the meat
with insecticide.49 Many similar examples can be found with a simple Internet search.
Food service establishments can also be targeted by customers, who may tamper
with easy access self-service areas, such as buffets.47 An example of a customer
tampering with a buffet is mentioned in a previous section, Introduction to Bioterrorism.
The case of the Rajneeshees is mentioned as an example of bioterrorism, but it can also
be used as an example of food tampering. This particular group visited restaurants with
salad bars and deliberately contaminated these salad bars with salmonella bacteria.4
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 80% of the foods consumed
by Americans and is responsible for developing a plan to prevent food contamination,
both deliberate and accidental.50 The FDA published a guidance document meant to
provide security recommendations to facility operators in the food service industry,
including producers, processors, transporters, and retailers. This document provides
suggestions in seven areas: management of food security, security of the physical facility,
employee security, protection of computer systems, safety of raw materials and
packaging, security of operations, and security of finished products.51 This document is
freely available to the public.
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Methodology
Institutional Review Board
Western Kentucky University (WKU) requires that all research involving human
subjects must be approved by an independent Institutional Review Board (IRB). In
cooperation with this rule, permission to conduct the research was requested on June 20,
2012. IRB approval was granted on June 27, 2012 under reference code IRB12-312. The
IRB approval document can be viewed in Appendix A.

Meat Processing Survey
A survey was designed to assess security implementations and industry
expectations of an agroterrorism or food tampering event for meat processing facilities
and food service establishments. The questionnaire for meat processing facilities was
based on the General Food Defense Plan published by the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA).52 No identifiable information was collected. The first section of
this questionnaire was designed to determine how familiar meat processing executives in
Kentucky are with the concepts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism. There were also
questions in this section asking these executives to rate how likely they perceive an
agroterrorism event is to occur both in general and at their facilities specifically, as well
as whether or not each facility has a functional food defense plan in place. The next ten
sections assessed security in the following areas: outside security measures, shipment
security, mail security, indoor security measures, slaughter/processing area security,
water system security, hazardous material security, information security, employee/non-
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employee security, and incident response. The questionnaire given to meat processing
facilities is shown in Appendix B.
A phone call was administered to every meat processing facility (n = 61)
published in the 2007 Directory of Kentucky Livestock Processors. The call solicited
participation in the survey. If permission by the owner was obtained, an interview was
scheduled with each owner or manager at his/her place of business. If permission was
denied, no further phone calls were made to the refusing facility. A second round of
phone calls was made to the facilities that were not contacted with the first round of
phone calls. If contact was made, participation in the survey was solicited. If contact
was not initiated, a final round of calls was made. Eight appointments were made
following the first round of calls, one appointment after the second round, and none after
the final round. Nine surveys in total were completed.
The surveys were personally delivered and completed by the owner or manager in
a private room. Due to the secure nature of the survey, the completed survey was sealed
in an envelope and locked in a box. When the survey period was completed, the survey
responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel file for analysis. An attempt was made to
do a statistical comparison of the responses based on the size of the facility.
Unfortunately, only processing facilities that described themselves as ‘small’ completed
the survey, so a statistical comparison was unable to be made. An observational study
was done instead.
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Food Service Establishment Survey
The questionnaire given to food service establishments is shown in Appendix C.
No identifiable information was collected. The first section is similar to the first section
of the questionnaire for meat processing facilities. This section solicited information
regarding the owners’/managers’ familiarity with bio- and agro-terrorism, as well as how
secure they perceive their establishments to be. It also enquired about the presence or
lack of a functional food defense plan for the establishment. The remaining sections
assessed security in the following areas: general security measures, employee security,
food security, hazardous materials security, information security, and incident response.
The target population for this study was all food service establishments in the
state of Kentucky. However, due to time and budget constraints, the actual population
was all restaurants in Warren County, Kentucky. The sampling frame was all food
service establishments that have a food service permit on file at the Barren River District
Health Department (BRDHD).
Initially, a mail-based survey was attempted. One hundred surveys, along with a
self-addressed and stamped return envelope, were mailed to a random sample of food
service establishments from the sampling frame. Only four were completed and returned.
Due to the poor return rate and the relatively high cost of mailing questionnaires, it was
decided to attempt a different survey methodology.
During the second attempt, the survey was administered to food service managers
that attended a food manager certification course taught at the BRDHD during the
months of December 2012 and January 2013. Solicitation for participation in the survey
was requested at the time of the course. Completed surveys were collected at the end of
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the course by either the researcher or the instructor of the course. In total, 31
questionnaires were completed during this time, for a total of 35 completed
questionnaires. The survey responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet,
and a statistical comparison between restaurants and non-restaurants was performed. A
students’ t test was used to compare means, and Fishers’ exact test was used to compare
categorical data between the two groups.

Results
Meat Processing Facilities
Section 1: Type of Meat Processed
In order to determine the size of the meat processing facility, the study
participants were asked whether their facilities were small, medium, or large. Only four
of nine participants answered this question. All of them answered they are ‘small’
facilities. The study participants were also asked to name the meat products distributed
by their facility. They were given a list of meats to choose from: beef/veal, pork, poultry,
sheep/lamb, other, and none. Four of nine participants answered this question. Table 1
lists the products sold by these participants.

Table 1. Products Distributed By Participating Meat Processing Facilities
Product
Number of Facilities Selling Product
3
Beef/Veal
3
Pork
3
Poultry
1
Sheep/Lamb
0
Other
0
None
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Section 2: Agroterrorism
The purpose of this section was to determine meat processing facility owners’
familiarity with the terms ‘bioterrorism’ and ‘agroterrorism’, as well as their concern that
such an attack may occur against the U.S. and their facility specifically. Questions one
and two asked the participants to rank from one to four their familiarity with both terms,
with one being “completely unfamiliar” and four being “completely familiar”. Questions
three and four asked the participants to rank from one to five their concern that a
deliberate agroterrorism attack may occur against both the U.S. and their facility, with
one implying “no concern” and five implying “extreme concern”. The means and
standard deviations from these questions are given in Table 2.

Table 2. Knowledge and Concern of Meat Processors Regarding an Agroterrorism Attack
Question
Mean
Standard
Deviation
3.1
0.9
Familiarity with Bioterrorism
3.0
1.1
Familiarity with Agroterrorism
2.7
0.7
Concern About Agroterrorist Attack Against U.S.
1.7
0.7
Concern About Agroterrorist Attack Against
Facility
Participants reported that they were on average ‘somewhat familiar’ with the
terms ‘bioterrorism’ and ‘agroterrorism’. They reported slight concern that an incidence
of agroterrorism may occur against the U.S. and hardly any concern that an attack could
happen to their facilities specifically. Questions five and six asked participants if their
facilities had ever been evaluated for security risks, and if not, if they were interested in
undergoing such an evaluation. Five facilities reported that they had undergone security
evaluations, and three reported they had not. Of those three, two were not interested in
being evaluated and one was unsure.
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Section 3: Outside Security Measures
This section sought to determine what sorts of physical security measures were
implemented by meat processors to protect the facility itself. This includes the main
facility building, as well as any outside storage buildings that may be present. Questions
were asked regarding perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras and alarm systems, and the
locking of doors and windows. Table 3 shows the total number of responses regarding
physical security at these meat processing facilities.

Table 3. Meat Processors’ Responses Regarding Physical Security of the Premises
Physical Security Type
Facilities with
Facilities without
1
7
Perimeter Fencing
1
7
Surveillance Cameras
7
1
Locked Entrances
8
0
Locked Windows/Air Vents
Presence of Outdoor Storage
2
7
Facilities
0
2
Access to Outdoor Facilities
Locked Entrances to Outdoor
0
2
Facilities
4
5
Alarm Systems
3
2
Maintenance of Alarm Systems
Among the respondents, locking windows and doors of the facility was very
commonly done. Surveillance cameras and perimeter fencing were not very common.
Alarm systems were utilized by approximately half the participating facilities. Among
those facilities with alarm systems, approximately half stated they were updated regularly
according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

Section 4: Shipment Security
This section sought to determine the security procedures in place at the processing
facilities for incoming and outgoing packages. Participants were asked if packages were
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examined before entering or exiting the facility, if vehicles were examined before
entering or exiting the facility, and if loading docks were secured and monitored when in
use. Table 4 presents the total number of responses regarding security of shipments.

Table 4. Security of Shipments Delivered and Received By Meat Processors
Security Type
Examination of Incoming
Packages
Examination of Outgoing
Packages
Examination of Incoming
Vehicles
Examination of Outgoing
Vehicles
Presence of a Loading Dock
Security of Loading Dock

Facilities with

Facilities without

7

2

8

1

1

8

0
3
2

9
6
1

Among the respondents, it was common to examine packages both upon entering
and exiting the facility. It was not common to examine vehicles either upon entering or
upon exiting. Most facilities stated they did not have a loading dock. Among those that
did have a loading dock, two stated that the loading dock was secured and monitored, and
one stated it was not.

Section 5: Mail Security
The purpose of this section was to determine the facilities’ policies for handling
suspicious mail. Participants were asked if mail was examined for possible threats, if
employees were trained to recognize suspicious mail, and if mail handling was done in a
safe location. This section included questions 30 through 33. Question 33, which asked
participants to elaborate on the procedure for handling suspicious mail, was a free
response question. Free response questions are questions where the participant is not
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given answer choices. The response to this question is documented in Appendix D. The
rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t
know’. Table 5 shows the total number of each response in this section for the non-free
response questions.

Table 5. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Meat Processors
Security Type
Facilities With
Facilities Without
9
0
Safe Mail Handling
5
4
Examination of Mail
Employee Training
Regarding the Safe Handling
2
7
of Mail
All participants responded that mail handling was done in a safe location, away
from any animal or meat processing activities that may be occurring. Approximately half
the respondents stated that they examined mail before opening it, and only two stated that
employees at their facilities were trained to look for suspicious mail.

Section 6: Indoor Security Measures
The purpose of this section was to determine what attempts were made by meat
processing facilities to secure the inside of the facility. Participants were asked about
whether or not restricted areas of the facility were clearly marked, whether or not
emergency lighting was present, and whether employees were familiar with any
emergency exit policies that may be in place. Questions regarding whether or not new
materials brought into the facility were examined before use, as well as questions about
inventory documentation were also asked in this section.
This section included questions 34 through 43. One free response question asking
participants how often they update their inventory is included. The rest of the questions in
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this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 6 shows the
total number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions.

Table 6. Security of the Inside of Meat Processing Facilities
Security Type
Facilities With
2
Restricted Areas
Examination of New or Unused
7
Materials
6
Documentation of Inventory
Reporting of Unexpected
5
Changes in Inventory
4
Presence of Emergency Lighting
Existence of Emergency Exit
6
Policies
Awareness of Employees of
4
Emergency Exit Policies
3
Periodic Emergency Drills
Awareness of Emergency
Response Personnel of
3
Emergency Exit Policies

Facilities Without
7
1
2
2
5
3
0
1

1

The majority of respondents stated that restricted areas of their facilities were not
clearly marked. Most of the respondents also stated that new materials entering the
facility were examined before use, and that inventory was documented. Just over half the
respondents stated that unexpected changes in inventory would be reported to appropriate
authorities. Approximately half the facilities have emergency lighting in place, and 2/3
of the respondents stated that their facilities had emergency exit policies. Of those that
have emergency exit policies, only one stated that their employees were unfamiliar with
them.
Question 37 asked respondents how often they updated their inventory. Six
participants responded to this question. The responses were highly variable, ranging
from those that update inventory every day to those that update every 90 days. The
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average number of days between updates was 22.7 days, with a standard deviation of
34.7 days.

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security
The purpose of this section was to determine the security measures in place in the
slaughtering area, for those facilities that store live animals, and the processing area.
Respondents were asked whether live animals were stored at their facilities. For those
that answered in the affirmative, questions were asked regarding whether animals were
inspected, whether screening was performed to detect diseased animals, and what policies
were in place when a diseased animal was discovered. Questions regarding access to
animals and animal records were also addressed in this section. For any facilities with
active meat processing, questions were asked about access to the meat products, testing
of meat products, and inventory documentation of any non-meat products used in food
meant for human or animal consumption.
This section included questions 44 through 76. Questions 45 through 67 were
only answered by those respondents that stated live animals were stored at their facilities.
Free response questions asking participants which institutions were alerted when a
disease animal was discovered, other procedures used for responding to a diseased
animal, and how long purchase receipts are kept onsite are included. The responses to
these questions are documented in Appendix D. The rest of the questions in this section
required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 7 shows the total
number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions.
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Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors
Facilities Facilities
Security Type
With
Without
4
5
Storage of Live Animals
4
0
Federal Inspection of Stored Animals
4
0
Abnormal Behavior Screening
0
3
Slaughter of Diseased Animal
4
0
Laboratory Testing of Disease Animal
2
1
Quarantine of Remaining Animals
3
1
Restricted Access to Animals
1
3
Recording of Visitation to Animal Storage
4
0
Recording of Stored Animals
2
2
Recording of Animal Purchase Site
2
2
Recording of Animal Purchase Date
2
2
Onsite Maintenance of Records
1
3
Visitor Access to Animal Storage Facilities
0
2
Requirement of Visitors to Animal Storage to Sign In
Accompaniment of Visitors to Animal Storage by
2
0
Appropriate Personnel
4
0
Performing of Animal Slaughter
4
0
Restriction of Access to Slaughtering Area
1
3
Recording of Visitation to Slaughtering Area
4
0
Recording of Specific Animal Slaughtered
4
0
Recording of Date of Slaughter
4
0
Periodic Testing on Slaughtered Animals
2
2
Access of Non-Employees to Slaughtering Areas
Requirement of Non-Employees to Sign In When
0
2
Visiting Slaughtering Area
Accompaniment of Non-Employees to Slaughtering
2
0
Facility by Appropriate Personnel
2
0
Restriction of Access to Animal Control Equipment
8
1
Storage of Meat Products
8
0
Restriction of Access to Meat Products
Recording of Inventory of Date of Storage of Meat
6
2
Products
5
3
Periodic Testing of Meat Products
6
3
Storage of Non-Meat Products used in Food
6
0
Restriction of Access to Non-Meat Products
6
0
Recording of Non-Meat Product Purchase Site
6
0
Recording of Non-Meat Product Purchase Date
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Table 7. Security of Slaughter and Processing Areas By Meat Processors
Facilities
Facilities
Security Type
With
Without
6
0
Recording of Non-Meat Product Storage Date
6
0
Periodic Examination of Non-Meat Products
Four respondents stated that live animals were stored on their facilities. At these
facilities, all animals are inspected by a veterinarian, and all animals are screened for
symptoms of disease. If disease is found, the animals are not slaughtered but are instead
sent away for laboratory testing. Other animals in the facility are quarantined and tested.
Access to the animals is restricted by all but one facility.
All respondents with live animal storage state that records are maintained for
every animal stored at the facility. Two facilities stated that these records included where
and when the animal was purchased. Two respondents stated that purchase receipts for
animals were maintained onsite and kept for a range of one to seven years. All four
respondents keep records regarding which animals are slaughtered and when, and each
respondent conducts periodic testing on slaughtered animals. Two of the facilities
allowed visitor access to the slaughtering area. Neither of these facilities required visitors
to sign in when entering the area, although both facilities stated that any visitors are
accompanied by appropriate personnel.
All but one respondent stated that meat products were stored at their facilities. Of
these respondents, all stated that access to the meat products was restricted. Inventory
records regarding the date of storage for the meat products is available for 75% of
respondents. Five respondents stated that periodic testing was performed on meat
products to detect disease and ensure quality. Six respondents stated that ingredients
other than meat were stored in the facility. Of these respondents, all six stated that access
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to these ingredients was restricted, and that inventory records were kept regarding the
company the ingredients were purchased from, the date of purchase, and the date of
storage. All six respondents stated that periodic examination of the ingredients was
performed to check for evidence of tampering.

Section 8: Water System Security
The purpose of this section was to determine the policies for securing the water
systems present at each meat processing facility. The systems included in this section
were potable water storage tanks, water reuse systems, transfer lines, and ice-making
equipment. This section included questions 78 through 89. The questions in this section
required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 8 shows the total
number of each response in this section for each question.
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Table 8. Security of Water Systems By Meat Processors
Security Type
Facilities With
Presence of Storage
1
Tanks of Potable Water
Restriction of Access to
1
Potable Water Tanks
Examination of Potable
1
Water Tanks
Periodic Testing of
Water in Potable Water
1
Tanks
Presence of Water Reuse
9
System
Restriction of Access to
0
Water Reuse System
Monitoring of Water
0
Reuse System
2
Use of Transfer Lines
Restriction of Access to
1
Transfer Lines
Examination of Transfer
1
Lines
Use of Ice Making
1
Equipment
Restriction of Access to
1
Ice Making Equipment

Facilities Without
8
0
0

0
0
0
0
7
1
1
8
0

Only one respondent stated that storage tanks of potable water were in use at that
facility. This respondent stated that access to the storage tanks was restricted, and the
tanks were monitored for evidence of tampering. No facilities reported use of a water
reuse system. Two facilities reported use of transfer lines for moving water or feed. Of
these two facilities, one reported that access to the lines was restricted and that the lines
were periodically examined for evidence of tampering. One respondent reported use of
ice-making equipment. This respondent stated that access to the ice-making equipment
was restricted.
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Section 9: Hazardous Material Security
The purpose of this section was to determine the policies regarding storage and
disposal of hazardous materials for meat processing facilities. Questions regarding
access to stored hazardous materials were also posed in this section. This section
included questions 90 through 95. One free response questions asking participants what
their procedures were for handling inconsistencies in their inventory of hazardous
materials was included. Responses to this question are documented in Appendix D. The
rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t
know’. Table 9 shows the total number of each response in this section for the non-free
response questions.

Table 9. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste By Meat Processors
Security Type
Facilities With
Facilities Without
2
7
Storage of Hazardous Materials
Restriction of Access to
2
0
Hazardous Materials
Documentation of Inventory of
0
2
Hazardous Materials
Proper Disposal of Hazardous
5
2
Waste
Restriction of Access to
5
1
Hazardous Waste
Only two respondents reported the storage of bulk quantities of hazardous
materials at their facilities. Both facilities restrict access to the hazardous materials, but
neither keeps an inventory of the materials in use at the facility. Five facilities reported
the proper disposal of hazardous waste. These five facilities also reported that access to
hazardous wasted was restricted. Two respondents stated that hazardous waste was not
properly disposed of at their facilities, and one respondent stated that access to the
hazardous waste was not restricted.
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Section 10: Information Security
The purpose of this section was to analyze methods for securing information and
computer systems in meat processing facilities. Respondents were asked about
controlling access to documents regarding facility layout, processing procedures, and
inventory documentation. Respondents were also asked whether or not they secured their
computer systems with passwords, firewalls, and virus protection. This section included
questions 96 through 102. The questions in this section required an answer of either
‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 10 shows the total number of each response in this
section for each question.

Table 10. Security of Information Stored at Meat Processing Facilities
Security Type
Facilities With
Facilities Without
Restriction of Access to
Information About Facility
6
3
Layout
Restriction of Access to
Information About Facility
8
1
Processing
Restriction of Access to
8
1
Inventory Documentation
6
3
Use of Computer System
6
0
Password Protection
5
0
Use of Firewall
5
0
Use of Virus Protection Software
Six respondents reported that access to information regarding facility layout was
restricted. Eight respondents reported that access to information regarding processing
procedures and inventory documentation was restricted. Six respondents reported use of
a computer system in their facilities. Of these respondents, all six reported that
passwords were required to access the system, and five reported use of a firewall and
virus protection software.
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Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security
The purpose of this section was to determine what requirements are in place for
employees and visitors of meat processing facilities in order to promote safety and
security. Respondents were asked if employees and visitors were required to wear
identification materials or sign in and out when entering or exiting the facility. Questions
asking about restricting the use of cameras and cell phones with cameras and background
checks and security training for new employees were also posed in this section. This
section included questions 103 through 114. The questions in this section required an
answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 11 shows the total number of each
response in this section for each question.
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Table 11. Security of Employees and Non-Employees By Meat Processing Facilities
Security Type
Facilities With
Facilities Without
Identification Materials on
1
8
Employees
Requirement of Employees to
5
4
Sign In and Out
Background Checks for
4
5
Employees
Restriction of Use of Cameras
3
6
and Cell Phones for Employees
Requirement of Security
2
7
Training
Interest in Providing Security
1
6
Training
Availability of Information On
Threat Response Policies for
4
4
Employees
Requirement of Employees to
8
1
Report Suspicious Activity
Timely Investigation of
7
0
Employee Reports
Requirement of Visitors to
2
6
Sign In
Requirement of Identification
1
7
Materials For Visitors
Restriction of Cameras and
3
5
Cell Phones for Visitors
Eight respondents stated that employees were not required to wear identification
materials. Five facilities require employees to sign in and out when entering and exiting
the facility. Four facilities require background checks, and two facilities provide security
training for new employees. Of the seven facilities that do not provide security training,
only one respondent expressed interest in providing such training in the future. Three
facilities restrict employees and visitors from carrying cameras or cell phones with
cameras onto facility grounds. All facilities but one require employees to report
suspicious activity, and all respondents reported that employee reports are investigated

32

immediately. Only two facilities require visitors to sign in when entering the facility, and
only one facility requires visitors to wear identification materials.

Section 12: Incident Response
The purpose of this section was to determine whether meat processing facilities
have policies in place to deal with an actual incidence of terrorism. Respondents were
asked about quarantine procedures and food recall plans. They were also asked if
emergency contact information was kept up to date. This section included questions 115
through 118. The questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I
don’t know’. Table 12 shows the total number of each response in this section for each
question.

Table 12. Incident Response By Meat Processing Facilities
Security Type
Facilities With
Facilities Without
Existence of Product
7
2
Quarantine Procedures
Existence of Food Recall
8
1
Plan
4
4
Testing of Food Recall Plan
Up-To-Date Emergency and
Personnel Contact
8
0
Information
Seven respondents reported that they did have policies in place to quarantine
animals when an attack is suspected. Eight respondents reported having a food recall
plan, although only four respondents reported having tested their plan. Eight respondents
reported that all emergency contact information was kept up to date.
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Food Service Establishments
Section 1: Descriptive Statistics
This section asked participants to describe the type of food service establishment
they worked for. The types included in the section were chain restaurant, non-chain
restaurant, school or child day care cafeteria, hospital or long-term care facility, hotel or
bed and breakfast, and other. This section was completed by 30 respondents. Table 13
shows the distribution of respondents.

Table 13. Distribution of Food Service Establishments
Type
Number of Respondents
5
Chain Restaurant
7
Non-chain Restaurant
9
School/Child Day Care Cafeteria
3
Hospital/Long Term Care Cafeteria
1
Hotel/Bed and Breakfast
5
Other
5
Unanswered
Total
35
The data from this section was used as a basis for comparison during the rest of
the analysis. Two groups composing of restaurants (chain and non-chain) and nonrestaurants (schools, hospitals, hotels, and others) were created. A comparison of these
two groups was conducted.

Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense
This section sought to determine familiarity with the term “bioterrorism”, concern
about an incidence of food tampering, and concern about food defense among food
permit holders in Warren County, Kentucky. The first, third, and sixth questions required
participants to rank from one to four their familiarity with bioterrorism, food tampering,
and the Guidance Document, with a rank of one implying complete unfamiliarity and
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four implying complete familiarity. The second, fourth, and fifth questions required
participants to rank from one to five their concern about a bioterrorism attack against the
U.S., a food tampering incident in their establishment, and food defense for their
establishment, with one implying no concern and five implying extreme concern. The
mean and standard deviation for each of these questions are listed in Table 14.

Table 14. Concern About Bioterrorism, Food Tampering, and Food Defense Expressed
By Food Service Establishments
Question
Mean for
Standard
Mean for
Standard
Restaurants Deviation for
NonDeviation for
Restaurants
Restaurants
NonRestaurants
2
1.1
2.9
0.9
Familiarity with
Bioterrorism
2
1.7
3.4
1.4
Concern About
Bioterrorism
Attack Against
U.S.
2.5
1.0
2.8
0.8
Concern About
Food Tampering
Incident in U.S.
1.5
1.9
1.5
1.0
Concern About
Food Tampering
Event in
Establishment
1
1.7
1.8
1.3
Concern With
Food Defense
1.5
1.2
2.1
1.2
Familiarity with
Guidance
Document
A student’s t-test was used to compare the means for each of the two groups
under discussion. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 15.
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Table 15. Probabilities Associated with Students’ t Analysis of Table 14
Question
p-value
0.5
Familiarity with Bioterrorism
1.0
Concern About Bioterrorism Attack Against U.S.
0.8
Concern About Food Tampering Incident in U.S.
0.05
Concern About Food Tampering Event in Establishment*
0.08
Concern With Food Defense*
0.5
Familiarity with Guidance Document
*Implies statistical significance
Since the sample size was so small, a higher than usual level of significance, 0.1,
was used throughout this analysis. At a significance level of 0.1, it was determined that
there was a significant difference in the two groups for questions four and five.
Restaurant managers are less concerned about a targeted food tampering incident in their
establishment and less concerned about food defense overall than non-restaurants.
The final question in this section inquired whether food permit holders would be
interested in reviewing “Guidance Document for Retail Food Stores and Food
Establishments” published by the FDA. This document provides recommendations on
food defense for food service establishments. Participants were asked to respond with
‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. In the restaurant group, seven participants responded ‘yes’,
three responded ‘no’, and three responded ‘I don’t know’. In the non-restaurant group,
eleven participants responded ‘yes’, one responded ‘no’, and six responded ‘I don’t
know’. To simplify analysis, those that responded ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’ were
combined. A Fisher’s exact analysis was used to compare the groups and resulted in a pvalue of 0.5. There is no significant difference in the interest level for reviewing this
document between the two groups.
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Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense
This section compared managerial responsibilities for food defense between the
restaurant and non-restaurant groups. Questions enquired about food defense plans,
availability of contact information for the police department, fire department, ambulance,
the public health department, and homeland security, and whether managers encouraged
staff to be vigilant about food tampering. Each question in this section required an
answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. This section comprised questions eight
through seventeen of Appendix C. Table 16 shows the total number of each response in
Section 3.

Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service
Establishments
Non-Restaurant
Restaurant Group
Group
Type of Security
I don't
I don't
Yes No
Yes No
know
know
5
4
3
5
7
6
Existence of Food Defense Plan
3
2
0
3
1
1
Familiarity with Food Defense Plan
Exercise of Food Defense Plan
3
2
0
3
1
1
Within One Year
Periodic Security Inspections by
10
2
0
12
5
1
Manager or Designated Employee
Familiarity with Contact
12
0
0
16
0
2
Information for Police
Familiarity with Contact
12
0
0
16
0
2
Information for Fire Department
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Table 16. Managerial Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service
Establishments
Non-Restaurant
Restaurant Group
Group
Type of Security
I don't
I don't
Yes No
Yes No
know
know
Familiarity with Contact
12
0
0
16
0
2
Information for Ambulance
Familiarity with Contact
11
1
0
16
1
1
Information for Public Health
Department
Familiarity with Contact
4
4
4
10
3
5
Information for Homeland Security
Agency
Encouragement of Vigilance in Staff
11
0
1
15
1
2
Members
Awareness of Employees of
11
0
1
13
1
4
Manager to Report to
Timely Investigation of Staff
11
0
1
14
0
4
Reports
9
3
0
15
1
2
Presence of “Person in Charge”
Restriction of Employees With
11
1
0
15
2
1
Symptoms of Foodborne Illness

A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups. For
statistical analysis, those that responded ‘no’ and ‘I don’t know’ were combined. They
were combined in this way in all following Fisher’s analyses. Table 17 shows the results
of the Fisher’s analysis for each question in this section.
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Table 17. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 16
Security Type
p-value
0.5
Existence of Food Defense Plan
1.0
Familiarity with Food Defense Plan
1.0
Exercise of Food Defense Plan Within One Year
0.4
Periodic Security Inspections by Manager or Designated Employee
0.5
Familiarity with Contact Information for Police
0.5
Familiarity with Contact Information for Fire Department
0.5
Familiarity with Contact Information for Ambulance
1.0
Familiarity with Contact Information for Public Health Department
0.3
Familiarity with Contact Information for Homeland Security Agency
0.6
Encouragement of Vigilance in Staff Members
0.4
Awareness of Employees of Manager to Report to
0.6
Timely Investigation of Staff Reports
0.7
Presence of “Person in Charge”
0.6
Restriction of Employees With Symptoms of Foodborne Illness
At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the
two groups.

Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense
The purpose of this section was to determine what the responsibilities and
requirements for staff were in each establishment. Respondents answered questions
regarding background checks for new employees, staff uniforms, access to employeeonly restricted areas, and security training for employees. Questions regarding security
training included whether or not employees were trained to monitor for suspicious
activity and foodborne illness. This section contains questions 18 through 30. Each
question in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’.
Questions 23 and 24, which asked about restricted areas, had an additional option of ‘Not
Applicable’ for those establishments without restricted areas. Table 18 shows the total
number of each response in Section 4.
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Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service
Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
I
I
don't
Not
don't
Not
Security Type
Yes No know Applicable Yes No know Applicable
Background
6
6
0
~
16
1
0
~
Checks
Identification
Materials For
9
3
0
~
12
6
0
~
Staff
Uniforms For
11
1
0
~
15
3
0
~
Staff
Collection of
Identification
Materials
From Former
10
2
0
~
9
6
3
~
Staff
Documentation
of Which
Employees Are
11
1
0
~
16
2
0
~
Working
Clearly
Marked
Restricted
6
3
0
3
13
2
0
3
Areas*
Access to
Restricted
Areas For
Necessary
Employees
7
1
0
4
13
2
0
3
Only*
Security
3
7
2
~
7
11
0
~
Training
Availability of
Threat
Response
6
4
2
~
13
2
3
~
Information
*This question had an additional option of ‘Not Applicable’ for those establishments without restricted areas.
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Table 18. Staff Responsibilities for Promoting Food Defense in Food Service
Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
I
I
Security
don't
Not
don't
Not
Type
Yes
No know Applicable Yes No know Applicable
Requirement
of
Employees
to Report
Suspicious
12
0
0
~
15
0
3
~
Activity
Monitoring
For Unusual
Activity
Conducted
11
0
1
~
14
1
2
~
by Staff
Foodborne
Illness
Training
Provided
8
3
1
~
12
1
4
~
For Staff
Requirement
to Report
Symptoms of
Foodborne
12
0
0
~
15
2
1
~
Illness

A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups. Those that
responded ‘Not Applicable’ in questions 23 and 24 were left out of the analysis for those
specific questions. Table 19 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each question
in this section.
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Table 19. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Section 4
Security Type
p-value
0.01
Background Checks*
0.7
Identification Materials For Staff
0.6
Uniforms For Staff
0.1
Collection of Identification Materials From Former Staff*
0.3
Documentation of Which Employees Are Working
1.0
Clearly Marked Restricted Areas
1.0
Access to Restricted Areas For Necessary Employees Only
0.7
Security Training
0.3
Availability of Threat Response Information
0.3
Requirement of Employees to Report Suspicious Activity
0.6
Monitoring For Unusual Activity Conducted by Staff
1.0
Foodborne Illness Training Provided For Staff
0.3
Requirement to Report Symptoms of Foodborne Illness
*Implies statistical significance
At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were
found in the questions regarding background checks and collection of identification
materials. The percentage of establishments in the non-restaurant group that require
background checks on new employees is significantly higher than in the restaurant group.
The percentage of establishments that collect name tags, uniforms, or other means of
identifying employees after the employee is no longer employed at the establishment is
significantly higher in the restaurant group.

Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security
The purpose of this section was to determine what the policies for dealing with
customers and visitors were for each establishment. For this survey, a ‘visitor’ was
defined as “those that are present in an official capacity, including but not limited to
delivery staff, health inspectors, contractors, or sales representatives.” Questions
included customer and visitor restrictions, as well as policies for accepting visitors such
as requiring proper identification and maintaining records of all official visitations. Each
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question in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table
20 shows the total number of each response in Section 5.

Table 20. Security of Customer and Visitors to Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
Security Type Yes No
I don't know
Yes No
I don't know
Restriction of
Customers
From Food
Preparation
12
0
0
15
2
1
Areas
Proper
Identification
Required For
11
1
0
16
2
0
Visitors
Documentation
Regarding
Purpose of
Visitor
8
4
0
12
4
1
Required
Requirement
For Visitors to
1
11
0
10
4
4
Sign In
Availability of
Documentation
of Visitor
2
8
1
11
3
3
Access
Accompaniment
of Visitors by
Appropriate
10
2
0
14
1
2
Personnel
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups. Table 21
shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each question in Section 5.
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Table 21. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 20
Security Type
p-value
0.3
Restriction of Customers From Food Preparation Areas
1.0
Proper Identification Required For Visitors
1.0
Documentation Regarding Purpose of Visitor Required
0.02
Requirement For Visitors to Sign In*
0.02
Availability of Documentation of Visitor Access*
1.0
Accompaniment of Visitors by Appropriate Personnel
*Implies statistical significance

At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were
found in the questions regarding visitor sign-in requirements and visitor access
documentation. A higher percentage of establishments in the non-restaurant group
require visitors to sign in than in the restaurant group. A higher percentage of
establishments in the non-restaurant group maintain records of each time an official
visitation occurs than in the restaurant group.

Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security
The purpose of this section was to determine what steps establishment managers
take to ensure the physical security of the property. Questions in this section enquire
about locking and securing entrances and windows, whether or not surveillance cameras
and alarm systems are in use, and the security of any outdoor storage facilities that may
be present at each establishment. This section included questions 37 through 50 of
Appendix C. Several free response questions asking participants to elaborate on how
they ensured all doors and windows were locked, how often they ensured their alarm
system was working, and any other security measures they used to prevent unauthorized
entry were included in this section. The responses to these questions are documented in
Appendix E. The rest of the questions in this section required an answer of either ‘yes’,
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‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 22 shows the total number of each response in this section
for the non-free response questions.

Table 22. Physical Security of Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
Security Type Yes No
I don't know
Yes No
I don't know
Locked
11
1
0
15
2
1
Entrances
Locked
Windows/Air
10
2
0
11
4
3
Vents
Surveillance
8
4
0
11
7
0
Cameras Inside
Surveillance
Cameras
6
6
0
10
7
1
Outside
6
6
0
11
4
3
Alarm Systems
Appropriate
Maintenance of
8
1
1
9
0
2
Alarm Systems
Presence of
Outdoor
Storage
5
7
0
9
7
2
Facilities
Restriction of
Access to
Storage
6
0
0
8
0
2
Facilities
Locking of
Storage
6
0
0
8
0
2
Facilities
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each nonfree response question. Table 23 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each nonfree response question in Section 6.
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Table 23: Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 22
Security Type
p-value
0.6
Locked Entrances
0.2
Locked Windows/Air Vents
1.0
Surveillance Cameras Inside
1.0
Surveillance Cameras Outside
0.7
Alarm Systems
1.0
Appropriate Maintenance of Alarm Systems
0.7
Presence of Outdoor Storage Facilities
0.5
Restriction of Access to Storage Facilities
0.5
Locking of Storage Facilities
At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the
two groups.

Section 7: Food Security
The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies for
potential targets of a food tampering incident, such as food delivery, food storage, and
food preparation activities. This section also sought to determine which establishments
keep a food inventory, what the inventory contains, and how often it is updated. This
section included questions 51 through 73 of Appendix C. Free response questions asking
participants to elaborate on their establishments’ policies for receiving unexpected food
in a delivery, their procedures for inconsistencies discovered in inventory records, and
their policies for discovering unlabeled food were included. The responses to these
questions are documented in Appendix D. The rest of the questions in this section
required an answer of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 24 shows the total
number of each response in this section for the non-free response questions.
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Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Security Type
Yes No
Delivery of Food by Approved
Sources
Inspection of Delivered Food By
Employees
Inventory Documentation
Available
Inventory Includes Which Foods
Delivered
Inventory Includes Food
Purchase Site
Inventory Includes Food Storage
Date
Inventory Includes Food Storage
Location
Inventory Includes Food
Expiration Date
Appropriate Labeling of Foods
Inspection of Stored Foods By
Employees
Appropriate Storage of Foods
According to FDA Guidelines
Appropriate Preparation of
Foods According to FDA
Guidelines
Foods with Potential For
Contamination Stored Separately
Laboratory Testing of
Contaminated Foods
Discarding of Expired Foods
Cleaning of Equipment Before
Each Use
Separate Storage of Different
Foods
Bulk Products Stored in Easily
Monitored Areas

I don't
know

Non-Restaurant
Group
I don't
Yes No
know

12

0

0

12

3

0

12

0

0

15

1

0

12

0

0

14

2

0

12

0

0

15

0

1

10

1

1

15

0

1

12

0

0

12

2

2

12

0

0

13

1

2

11

1

0

11

3

1

12

0

0

16

0

0

12

0

0

15

0

1

12

0

0

15

0

1

12

0

0

15

0

1

12

0

0

14

1

1

2

8

2

3

8

4

12

0

0

16

0

0

12

0

0

16

0

0

12

0

0

16

0

0

4

7

0

12

4

0
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Table 24. Security of Food in Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Security Type
Yes No

I don't
know

Non-Restaurant
Group
I don't
Yes No
know

Appropriate Cleaning of
Foods Before Use

12

0

0

13

1

2

Presence of Self-Service Areas

2

9

1

9

5

0

3

0

0

9

0

0

0

12

0

9

7

0

0

0

0

8

1

0

Monitoring of Self-Service
Areas
Presence of Vending
Machines
Restriction of Access to
Vending Machine Products

A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each nonfree response question. Table 25 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each nonfree response question in Section 7.
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Table 25. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 24
Security Type
p-value
0.2
Delivery of Food by Approved Sources
1.0
Inspection of Delivered Food By Employees
0.5
Inventory Documentation Available
1.0
Inventory Includes Which Foods Delivered
0.6
Inventory Includes Food Purchase Site
0.1
Inventory Includes Food Storage Date*
0.2
Inventory Includes Food Storage Location
0.3
Inventory Includes Food Expiration Date
1.0
Appropriate Labeling of Foods
1.0
Inspection of Stored Foods By Employees
1.0
Appropriate Storage of Foods According to FDA Guidelines
1.0
Appropriate Preparation of Foods According to FDA Guidelines
0.5
Foods with Potential For Contamination Stored Separately
1.0
Laboratory Testing of Contaminated Foods
1.0
Discarding of Expired Foods
1.0
Cleaning of Equipment Before Each Use
1.0
Separate Storage of Different Foods
0.06
Bulk Products Stored in Easily Monitored Areas*
0.2
Appropriate Cleaning of Foods Before Use
0.05
Presence of Self-Service Areas*
1.0
Monitoring of Self-Service Areas
0.002
Presence of Vending Machines*
~
Restriction of Access to Vending Machine Products^
*Implies statistical significance
^ As there was no response from the restaurant group for this question, a Fisher’s exact
analysis could not be performed.
At a significance level of 0.1, significant differences between the two groups were
found in the questions that asked about food storage dates, bulk products, presence of
self-service areas, and presence of vending machines. A higher percentage of restaurants
keep a food inventory that documents when foods are stored than non-restaurants. A
higher percentage of non-restaurants keep food products stored in bulk in easilymonitored public areas than restaurants. A higher percentage of non-restaurants contain
self-service areas, such as buffets and salad bars, and vending machines than restaurants.
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Question 56 asked participants to state how often their establishment updates the
food inventory. The average and standard deviation of the number of days between
updates was determined for each of the two groups. This is displayed in Table 26.

Table 26. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Number of Days between Inventory
Updates for Restaurants and Non-Restaurants
Group
Mean Number of Days Between
Standard Deviation (Number of
Updates
Days)
Restaurants
4.9
2.7
Non17.8
16.8
Restaurants
A students’ t test was performed to compare the means between the two groups.
A p-value of 0.02 resulted from this analysis. At a significance level of 0.1, it is
determined that there is a significant difference in the number of days between inventory
updates between restaurants and non-restaurants. On average, restaurants update their
inventory more often.

Section 8: Mail Security
The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies for
handling suspicious mail. Questions in this section enquired about where mail was
handled, whether or not mail was examined before opening, and what the procedures
were when suspicious mail was discovered. This section included questions 74 through
77 of Appendix C. One free response question asking participants to elaborate on their
procedures for handling suspicious mail was included. The responses to this question are
documented in Appendix E. The rest of the questions in this section required an answer
of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 27 shows the total number of each response
in this section for the non-free response questions.
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Table 27. Security of Incoming Mail Received By Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
Security Type Yes No
I don't know
Yes No
I don't know
Appropriate
Location for
8
2
2
15
1
0
Mail Handling
Examination of
7
4
1
9
1
6
Mail
Training of
Employees For
4
7
1
4
5
7
Mail Handling
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each nonfree response question. Table 28 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each nonfree response question in Section 8.

Table 28. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 27
Security Type
p-value
0.1
Appropriate Location for Mail Handling*
1.0
Examination of Mail
0.7
Training of Employees For Mail Handling
*Implies statistical significance
At a significance level of 0.1, a significant difference was found between the two
groups for question 74. A higher percentage of non-restaurants handle the mail away
from food preparation areas than restaurants.

Section 9: Hazardous Materials
The purpose of this section was to determine each establishment’s policies on
storing and disposing of hazardous materials. Questions in this section enquired about
whether these types of materials were stored, and if so, whether or not an inventory of
these materials was kept and if these materials were disposed of properly. This section
included questions 78 through 83 of Appendix D. One free response question asking
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participants to elaborate on their procedures for inconsistencies discovered in their
inventory of hazardous materials was included. The responses to this question are
documented in Appendix E. The rest of the questions in this section required an answer
of either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 29 shows the total number of each response
in this section for the non-free response questions.

Table 29. Security of Hazardous Materials and Waste in Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
I don't know
Yes No
I don't know
Security Type Yes No
Storage of
Hazardous
4
7
0
15
1
0
Materials
Restriction of
Access to
Hazardous
4
0
0
13
0
0
Materials
Documentation
of Inventory
For Hazardous
3
1
0
13
1
1
Materials
Proper
Disposal of
Hazardous
10
0
1
13
0
2
Waste
Restriction of
Access to
Hazardous
10
0
1
13
1
2
Waste
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each nonfree response question. Table 30 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each nonfree response question in Section 9.
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Table 30. Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 29
Security Type
p-value
1.0
Storage of Hazardous Materials
0.5
Restriction of Access to Hazardous Materials
0.6
Documentation of Inventory For Hazardous Materials
0.6
Proper Disposal of Hazardous Waste
1.0
Restriction of Access to Hazardous Waste
At a significance level of 0.1, no significant differences were found between the
two groups.

Section 10: Information Security
The purpose of this section was to determine the security of information and
computer systems for each establishment. Questions in this section enquired about
access to inventory documents and security of computer systems, including inquiries
about password protection, firewalls, and virus protection for the computer. This section
contains questions 84 through 88. Each question in this section required an answer of
either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know’. Table 31 shows the total number of each response in
this section.
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Table 31. Security of Information Kept By Food Service Establishments
Restaurant Group
Non-Restaurant Group
Security
Training
Yes No
I don't know
Yes No
I don't know
Restriction of
Access to
Inventory
2
0
13
0
3
Documentation 10
Use of
Computer
8
4
0
16
0
0
System
Use of Password
7
1
0
15
0
1
Protection
7
0
0
12
0
4
Use of Firewall
Use of Virus
Protection
7
0
0
13
0
3
Software
A Fisher’s exact analysis was performed to compare the two groups for each nonfree response question. Table 32 shows the results of the Fisher’s analysis for each nonfree response question in Section 10.

Table 32: Probabilities Associated with a Fisher’s Analysis of Restaurants Versus NonRestaurants in Table 31
Security Type
p-value
1.0
Restriction of Access to Inventory Documentation
0.02
Use of Computer System*
1.0
Use of Password Protection
0.3
Use of Firewall
1.0
Use of Virus Protection Software
*Implies statistical significance
At a significance level of 0.1, a significant difference between the two groups was
found for question 85. A higher percentage of non-restaurants utilize a computer system
than restaurants.
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Discussion
Meat Processing Facilities
Section 1: Study Design
Before getting started with this portion of the project, it was understood that data
collection would be difficult. It was assumed that there would be some resistance on the
part of the processors to give out potentially compromising security information. To
combat this, a face-to-face survey was designed with the thought that the processors may
be more likely to trust someone they could speak with directly. It was also thought that a
face-to-face survey would be the best way to ensure a large enough sample size. In order
to boost the legitimacy of the survey, the processors were given the names and contact
information of everyone involved in the project, including the researcher, the research
advisor, and the Institutional Review Board. An incentive of the chance to win one of
two iPod Touches was also included.
Despite all of this, it was very difficult to solicit participation. Several common
reasons for refusal were given at the time of first contact by telephone. Many processors
were uninterested in the research itself, and therefore had no interest in participating.
Many felt that they were too busy to take any time out of their day to complete a survey.
Most commonly, many processors felt that their operation was too small to attract
attention for potential attack. Those that cited this reason felt that it was unnecessary for
them to participate in research concerning terrorism in the meat industry. Several meat
processing facilities stated that their businesses had closed as a result of the economic
downturn. It is possible that other facilities in the sampling population had similarly
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closed. For these reasons, although 61 meat processors were solicited, only nine agreed
to participate in the research.
Originally, a statistical comparison of meat processing facilities was planned
based on the size of the operation: small, medium, or large. Unfortunately, the question
(D1 of Appendix B) that asked the respondent to classify his/her operation by size was
printed on the back of the title page, making it very difficult to see. Many respondents
were unaware of this question. As a result, only four respondents answered it, and each
responded with ‘small’. Due to the low response rate and the lack of variability of the
size classification question, a statistical comparison could not be made. Instead, an
observational study was conducted.
The questionnaire for this portion of the project was divided up into twelve
sections, each with its own underlying theme. This chapter will follow the questionnaire,
with a discussion of each section separately.

Section 2: Agroterrorism
A deliberate attack by terrorists on agriculture has potentially devastating
economic and public health impacts. This section was designed to quantify the
familiarity of meat processors about the concepts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism, as
well as to quantify their concern that such an attack will occur against the U.S. or against
their operations specifically. The processors professed a modest familiarity with these
concepts but were generally unconcerned that an attack would occur, either against the
U.S. or their own operations. Slightly more concern was expressed that an attack would
occur against the U.S. than their operations. This lack of concern is reflective of the
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general attitude that was found among processors in Kentucky that their operation was
too small to warrant attention from terrorists.
This section also asked respondents if their facilities had ever been evaluated for
security risks. Three of eight respondents reported that they had not undergone any
security evaluations. None of these three respondents expressed any interest in having
their facilities evaluated, which reflects the general lack of concern for an attack against
their facilities found during this investigation.

Section 3: Outside Security Measures
Physical security measures taken to protect the facility itself are often the first line
of defense against attack. Features such as perimeter fencing, surveillance cameras, and
alarm systems may deter would-be attackers long enough for police to arrive or prevent
an attack from ever occurring. This section was designed to research what sorts of
physical security measures were being taken by meat processing facilities in Kentucky.
Respondents were asked a series of yes/no questions enquiring about the three features
discussed above, as well as whether or not doors and windows were locked during hours
of non-operation.
The locking of doors and windows was the most commonly reported security
measure. All facilities reported that the windows and air vents were locked and secured.
All but one facility reported that all entrances were secured during hours of nonoperation. Alarm systems, utilized by approximately half the respondents, were reported
as the next most common security measure. Approximately half of those that reported
having an alarm system also reported that the alarm systems maintained according to

57

manufacturing instructions. Two users of alarm systems reported that the alarm systems
were not maintained according to manufacturing instructions. This is quite discouraging
but reflective of the general lack of concern against an attack. Perimeter fencing and
surveillance cameras were reported least commonly among the respondents. One facility
reported perimeter fencing, and one facility reported surveillance cameras. As the
majority of facilities visited were in metropolitan areas, the lack of perimeter fencing
makes sense. There was just no room at these facilities for a fence around the property.
Surveillance cameras are a major expense, and given the lack of concern against an
attack, they may be seen as an unnecessary expense.

Section 4: Shipment Security
Packages, both incoming and outgoing, are potential sources for attack on a meat
processing facility. These packages may contain contaminated material designed to
sicken animals or the human beings working with them. Examining packages prior to
sending or receiving them is an important preventative measure against an attack. Every
facility should have a plan for dealing with suspicious packages, if the need should ever
arise. For facilities with loading docks, these may be potential sources of entry for an
attacker. It is important to secure these areas during times of loading and unloading.
This section was designed to research whether or not meat processors in Kentucky
undertake preventative measures in these areas. Respondents were asked a series of
yes/no questions enquiring whether incoming and outgoing packages were examined,
whether incoming and outgoing vehicles were examined, and whether loading docks
were securing during periods of loading and unloading.
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The majority of facilities reported that packages were examined, both incoming
and outgoing. Although simple examination may not prevent every contaminated
package from entering or leaving the facility, this step will decrease the likelihood of an
attack through shipments. Only three facilities reported having a loading dock. Of these,
only one reported that loading and unloading was not monitored. As there were only
three respondents with loading docks, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this.
Certainly, it would be inappropriate to make any generalizations about the security of
loading docks among all meat processors in Kentucky based on this data.

Section 5: Mail Security
This section of the questionnaire is related to Section 4 and seeks to examine
preventative security measures taken by meat processors in Kentucky against deliberate
attack through the mail. The best way to prevent attack by mail is to ensure that all mail
is opened away from any animal and meat processing activities at the facility. Similar to
the examination of packages, all mail should be examined for evidence of tampering prior
to opening. Employees should be trained to recognize suspicious mail. For this section,
respondents were asked a series of yes/no questions enquiring whether or not they opened
mail in a safe location, whether or not mail was examined prior to opening, and whether
or not employees were trained to recognize suspicious mail.
All nine respondents reported that mail was handled away from processing
activities occurring at the facility. This is quite encouraging, and it is likely that this is a
typical behavior exhibited by meat processing facilities in Kentucky. Approximately half
the respondents reported that mail was examined before opening. Ideally, all respondents
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should examine mail prior to opening, as this is a simple preventative measure to
undertake. It is one that does not require much additional time or expense. Only two
respondents reported that employees at their facilities were trained to recognize
suspicious mail. It makes sense that this number should be low, as employees are often
not responsible for opening mail at all.

Section 6: Indoor Security Measures
Although security measures designed to protect the exterior of the facility can
prevent an attack from ever occurring, security measures to protect the interior of the
facility also need to be implemented. If contaminated material ever manages to enter the
facility, security measures on the interior of the facility designed to detect such material
and protect the safety of employees may minimize the damage. These security measures
include appropriate inventory documentation, clear demarcation of restricted areas, and
emergency exit policies. This section was designed to research whether or not meat
processing facilities in Kentucky used some or all of these indoor security measures.
Questions were posed to respondents enquiring about inventory documentation and
updates, what the policy was for an unexpected change in the inventory, whether or not
restricted areas were clearly demarcated, whether or not new or previously unused
materials were examined before use, and whether or not emergency lighting and
emergency exit policies were present.
Surprisingly, only two respondents stated that restricted areas were clearly
marked and secured. This is alarming, as customers may unwittingly enter these areas,
which would compromise security and set-up a situation where potential contamination
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may occur. All but one meat processor reported that new and previously unused
materials are examined before use. This result is likely the case for most meat processors
in Kentucky and gives no cause for concern.
Six facilities reported that inventory was documented, and two facilities reported
that inventory was not documented. This is not a surprising finding. Many meat
processing facilities in Kentucky do not store meat products. These facilities process
meat brought in directly by the customer and return the meat the same day. Inventory at
these facilities is not required under federal law. For those facilities that do document
inventory, inventory is updated, on average, every 22.7 days, although a wide range from
every day to every 90 days was reported. The length of time between updates is likely
related to how often product moves in and out of a facility. If unexpected changes in
inventory occur, five of the six facilities reported that appropriate authorities are alerted,
and one respondent was unsure. This is an encouraging observation.
If an emergency does occur, having emergency exit policies in place greatly
improves the safety and likelihood of survival for employees. Safety can also be
improved by providing emergency lighting and periodically drilling employees.
Emergency response personnel should be aware of the facility’s emergency exit policies,
in order to improve rescue efficiency. Given the small size of the participating facilities,
it was expected that there would be little necessity for emergency lighting. Surprisingly,
nearly half the respondents reported that they did have emergency lighting. Six
respondents reported that emergency exit policies were in place at their facilities, and
three respondents reported that they had no emergency exit policies. Ideally, all facilities
would have emergency exit policies, as this can greatly decrease confusion during an
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emergency. However, many of the facilities had very few entrances, which may make
having an exit policy unnecessary.

Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security
The slaughtering and processing areas of a meat processing facility are the most
likely sources for potential contamination. The meat is handled directly in these areas, so
security is necessary. This section also included security measures implemented for the
protection of live animals stored at the facility. Questions were asked regarding access to
the animals or meat products, inspection of animals and products, inventory of animals
and products, and visitation records and policies for handling visitors to any of these
areas.
Only four of nine respondents reported storage of live animals on their facilities.
All respondents reported that appropriate federal inspections and laboratory testing were
carried out, which is greatly encouraging. All facilities kept some kind of inventory of
each animal stored there, however only two facilities reported that the inventory
contained the site of purchase. If this information is missing during a federal
investigation of an incident, it may be difficult to trace the source of contamination
should that have occurred prior to the animal arriving at the facility. All facilities
reported that access to the animals was restricted to appropriate personnel and only one
facility reported allowing visitation. All facilities reported that visitors would be
accompanied by personnel of the facility during the visit, but only two reported requiring
the visitors to sign-in. Ideally, complete visitation records would be kept by all facilities.
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This information gives investigators documentation of potential sources of contamination
during an incident.
When live animals are stored at a meat processing facility, these animals are
generally put to slaughter at some point. The four facilities that stated that live animals
were stored also stated that slaughtering was performed. Visitation to the slaughtering
facility was only allowed by one respondent. Two stated that visitors were not required
to sign in but were always accompanied by personnel of the facility. A recording of who
visited the facility was only kept by one respondent, likely the same one that allowed
visitors. All facilities reported that records of which animals were slaughtered as well as
the date of slaughter were kept onsite. All facilities reported that periodic laboratory
testing was performed on slaughtered animals to detect the presence of disease, which is
important to prevent the spread of contamination.
Finally, the majority of meat processing facilities reported that meat products
were stored onsite. All of these facilities reported restriction of access to the meat
products, which is potentially the most important security measure to take to prevent
contamination of the products. Six facilities reported that an inventory of all products
stored at the facilities was kept onsite, while two stated an inventory was not kept. If
inventory is not documented and maintained, it may be difficult to prevent contaminated
product from being slipped onto shelves or accidentally shipped. Periodic laboratory
testing of meat products was performed by five facilities, which is a good security
measure to implement to detect and stop the spread of contamination.
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Section 8: Water System Security
Water sources can be potential sites of contamination by waterborne pathogens.
These areas are commonly used by multiple animals, so the spread of contamination from
these pathogens could be devastating. Securing these sources can prevent attackers from
getting near enough to any water sources to deliberately contaminate the source.
Potential water sources in use by meat processing facilities are storage tanks of potable
water, water reuse systems, transfer lines, and ice making equipment.
Among the respondents in this study, water systems were very uncommonly
utilized. The most commonly used water system were transfer lines, utilized by two
facilities. Given the lack of positive response to this section of the study, no accurate
conclusions may be drawn.

Section 9: Hazardous Material Security
Hazardous materials are potential sources of contamination for water and feed
supplies at meat processing facilities. The storage of such materials should be properly
inventoried and secured, and the disposal of such materials should be performed
according to current federal standards. Any hazardous waste that may have to be
temporarily stored onsite should be secured.
Only seven respondents reported the storage of bulk quantities of hazardous
materials. Both of these respondents stated that access to these materials was restricted
but an inventory for these materials was not kept. Although it is difficult to draw
conclusions about meat processing facilities from the data of two respondents, it is
alarming that a proper inventory of these materials is not available. If such
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documentation exists, it is possible to detect theft of hazardous materials before a
contamination incident would occur.

Section 10: Information Security
Information regarding facility layout or processing procedures is often kept onsite
using paper-based or electronic systems, or both. This information can be utilized by
attackers to engineer a targeted attack against a specific area of the facility. Securing this
information is vital to protecting the integrity of the facility and preventing an attack. If
an electronic system is used, this system should, at minimum, be protected by a password
and antivirus software. Use of a firewall is also encouraged. If a paper-based system is
used, access to important documents should be locked and access should be restricted to
only those that require the information to perform their daily duties.
Three respondents reported that access to information regarding facility layout
was not restricted. This is likely due to the small size of the facilities managed by these
respondents. Many facilities were comprised of only one or two rooms, negating the
necessity for maps or floor plans. Nearly all facilities reported restriction of access to
information regarding facility processing procedures and inventory documentation.
Computer systems were utilized by six facilities, all of whom reported use of password
protection. Five of these respondents reported use of a firewall and virus protection
software, all encouraging signs.
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Section 11: Employee/Non-Employee Security
The purpose of this section was to determine policies in place at meat processing
facilities to prevent attacks by employees and visitors to the facility. Employees at these
facilities should be trust-worthy individuals, as determined by both a background check
and an onsite interview. Employees should always be recognizable to visitors by the use
of identification materials, such as name tags or uniforms. For larger facilities, both
employees and visitors should be restricted from entering the facility with cameras.
Security training for employees is recommended, and any employee reports of suspicious
activity should be investigated immediately. Identification material for visitors in an
official capacity, such as federal inspectors, should have material identifying them as well
as the intent of their visit.
The majority of respondents in this study stated that employees were not required
to wear identification materials. It was explained that because of the small size of the
facility in question, there were a very limited number of employees. Those that were not
employed by the facility were very recognizable to the employees. However, it is unclear
if the employees were very recognizable to the visitors. Background checks were only
used by half of the respondents. This is likely because many of the facilities were familyowned and family-run facilities. These types of facilities would not require background
checks. Security training was generally not provided, likely due to the small size of the
facilities. There was very little interest in providing security training, which is reflective
of the general lack of concern about an attack by the respondents. Visitors were
generally not identified in any tangible way.
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Section 12: Incident Response
Timely and efficient response to a contamination incident, either intentional or
unintentional, minimizes damages and can prevent further spread of the contamination.
Quarantine procedures and food recall plans should be in place and periodically tested.
Facilities that implement such plans will be better prepared, should an incident arise.
Seven facilities had product quarantine procedures in place. This is encouraging
and shows that food safety is of concern to facility owners. Eight respondents stated that
a food recall plan was in place, although only four reported having tested it. Although it
could be a difficult and inconvenient undertaking, testing the plan is important for
improving efficiency and minimizing damages from an incident.

Food Service Establishments
This study was originally designed as a mailed questionnaire, with all food
service establishments with permits at the BRDHD as the sampling frame. The total
sampling frame contained 536 food service establishments, and the original plan called
for 316 of these establishments to receive surveys. These 316 potential respondents were
chosen randomly. To test the response rate, 100 initial samples were sent out with a selfaddressed stamped envelope to return the survey. Four of these surveys were returned. It
was decided that this methodology would not generate the necessary responses for the
study, and a new methodology was designed. In order to combat the lack of response, an
attempt was undertaken to deliver the survey at the time of inspection by the local health
department, in this case, the BRDHD. It was thought that this would give the survey
some credibility, as it was being supported by a trusted government source. Several
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surveys were completed in this manner. The other surveys were completed by
participants in the food manager certification classes taught by the health inspectors at the
BRDHD. This methodology reduced the sampling frame to only those food service
establishments with permits in Warren County, Kentucky.
As with the study designed for meat processing facilities, it was difficult to solicit
participation in the security study for food service establishments. The most commonly
cited reason for refusal was a lack of time to complete the survey. Many managers,
particularly those that managed large chain restaurants, stated that further permission to
participate in the study was required by upper-level management. These managers stated
that it was unlikely that permission would be granted and were disinclined to participate.
In total, 35 surveys were completed.
A statistical comparison between restaurants, including chain and non-chain, and
non-restaurants, including schools, hospitals, and hotels, was performed. A student’s ttest was used to analyze those questions where a mean was calculated, and Fisher’s Exact
test was used to analyze those questions containing count data. Fisher’s Exact test was
used instead of chi-square due to the small sample size present in the study. An alpha
significance level of 0.1 was used to determine statistical significance. In total, there
were statistically significant differences between the two groups found in twelve survey
questions. These questions are shown in Table 33.
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Table 33. Statistically Significant Differences Found From a Study of Security in Food
Service Establishments
Question
p-value
(4) Concern About Food Tampering Event in Establishment 0.05
0.08
(5) Concern With Food Defense
0.01
(18) Background Checks
(21) Collection of Identification Materials From Former Staff 0.1
0.02
(34) Requirement For Visitors to Sign In
0.02
(35) Availability of Documentation of Visitor Access
0.1
(55C) Food Inventory Includes Food Storage Date
0.06
(68) Bulk Products Stored in Easily Monitored Areas
0.05
(70) Presence of Self-Service Areas
0.002
(72) Presence of Vending Machines
0.1
(74) Appropriate Location for Mail Handling
0.02
(85) Use of Computer System
Several of these significant differences are easy to explain, such as the presence of
vending machines and self-service areas. These two items are often found in schools,
hospitals, and hotels but are less likely to be found in restaurants. Computer systems are
also commonly utilized by schools, hospitals, and hotels, but are less commonly utilized
by restaurants. It is very unlikely to be required to sign-in when visiting a restaurant,
however schools and hospitals often utilize this practice. It goes along with this that
visitation records would be maintained by schools and hospitals but not restaurants.
It is surprising that a significant difference should be found in the level of concern
about a deliberate food tampering incident. It was assumed that concern would be high
amongst both groups, however, neither group expressed particular concern regarding
food tampering or food defense. Non-restaurants were slightly more concerned with both
food tampering and food defense. As these include schools and hospitals, where security
is considered of the utmost importance, it was surprising that little concern was
expressed.
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Background checks were more likely to be conducted by non-restaurants, which is
not particularly surprising as this group contains schools and hospitals. However,
collection of identification materials, including name tags and uniforms, from former
employees is most likely to be conducted by restaurants. As security is significantly
more important to non-restaurants, it was surprising that more respondents in this group
did not collect identification materials from former employees. If one or more of these
employees is considering an attack, it may be easier for them to blend in if they are
wearing appropriate work attire.
It was found that the restaurant group was more likely to include the date of food
storage in their food inventories than the non-restaurant group. This is surprising, as the
non-restaurant group is more concerned with food defense. It is less surprising that nonrestaurants were more likely to store commonly used products stored in bulk, such as
flour, spices, and sugar, in easily monitored areas. However, as these products are likely
to be targeted during a food tampering event, it is important that both groups be equally
likely to place these items in easily monitored areas.

Implications and Recommendations
Meat Processors
Food defense is of little concern to meat processing facilities in Kentucky. As
most of these facilities in this area are very small, it was found that many processors felt
that they were too small to be a target for terrorism. These facilities may also lack the
financial and technological resources necessary to implement a food defense plan.
Several steps need to be taken to promote food defense among these facilities. First, an
education program with information about agroterrorism and the risk to very small
70

processing facilities should be developed. Further studies could be conducted to
determine the efficacy of these programs in raising awareness. Second, the USDA
should provide an inspector specifically trained in food defense. This inspector could do
a thorough examination of the facilities and make individual recommendations for
improvements to be made. Third, public funding should be made available for these
facilities to use to improve defense. Finally, the data collected during this study is only
applicable to meat processing facilities in Kentucky. Further research on meat processors
around the U.S. is recommended.

Food Service Establishments
Food service establishments in Warren County profess little concern with food
defense. The non-restaurant group was slightly more concerned overall with food
defense than the restaurant group. This is likely because the non-restaurant group
contains schools and hospitals, which are locations where security is considered
extremely important. However, restaurants provide food service to many different people
every day. According to the USDA, full-service restaurants and fast food chains are the
two largest locations where Americans eat out.53 Since so many more Americans
patronize restaurants than patronize non-restaurants, food defense should be of highest
concern to the restaurant group. In order to promote food defense in this group, several
recommended actions should be undertaken. First, education programs promoting food
defense should be provided to restaurant owners and managers. Further studies could be
conducted to determine the efficacy of these programs in raising awareness. Second,
more media coverage of food tampering incidences may increase awareness of risk.
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Finally, the FDA should develop programs to provide incentives to restaurants that take
action to improve food defense.
Further research on this subject is required. The data collected during this study
is only applicable to Warren County, Kentucky. A more national study of food service
establishments is recommended. It was difficult to collect this data without the help of
the local health department, so further cooperation with local government agencies will
be required in any future studies.

Conclusions
Agroterrorism and food tampering are of increasing concern to the U.S. Although
few documented incidences of agroterrorism have been reported, hundreds of pages of
documented plans to attack the U.S. in this way have been discovered from Al Qaeda.28
For this reason, it is important to implement security strategies in food processing plants
and food service establishments. Meat processing facilities in Kentucky express little
concern that they will be the target of an attack. Regardless of this, these facilities
implement strategies to promote food defense and safety. In order to improve defense of
these facilities, programs need to be developed to educate food industry operators and
managers about agroterrorism and the risk to very small operations. Among food service
establishments, non-restaurant type establishments are slightly more concerned with food
tampering and food defense than restaurants, however neither group expressed particular
concern with either. Although these groups take food safety very seriously, food defense
should also be of great concern.
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All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported
promptly to this office.
This project has been determined to be a Minimal Risk project.
Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of three years after the
completion of the project.
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE USED SECURITY STUDY OF MEAT
PROCESSING FACILITIES

Project Title: Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing and Food
Service Establishments in Kentucky
Investigator: Morgan Webb-Yeates, Western Kentucky University
Department of Physics and Astronomy, 937-657-8108
Research Advisor: Dr. Vijay Golla, Western Kentucky University
Department of Public Health, 270-745-2448

Questionnaire for Meat Processing Facilities
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Section 1: Descriptive Statistics
This section is for analysis purposes only.
D1. How would you describe the size of this facility?
О
О
О

Small
Medium
Large

D2. What meat products are processed at this facility? Check any that apply.
О
О
О
О
О
О

Beef/Veal
Pork
Poultry
Sheep/Lamb
Other
None

Please List:____________________________
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Section 2: Agroterrorism
This section is designed to assess industry concerns about bioterrorism, agroterrorism, and
security.

1. Bioterrorism is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “the intentional
release of a pathogen or biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.” How familiar are
you with the concept of “bioterrorism”?
1
Completely Unfamiliar

2

3

4

Somewhat Unfamiliar

Somewhat Familiar

Completely Familiar

2. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism. It is defined as the deliberate introduction of a
plant or animal disease with the goal of causing fear, economic instability, illness, or death.
How familiar are you with the concept of “agroterrorism”?

1
Completely Unfamiliar

2

3

4

Somewhat Unfamiliar

Somewhat Familiar

Completely Familiar

3. Given what you know about agroterrorism, are you worried about an agroterrorism
attack occurring against the United States?

1

2

3

4

Not At All Worried

5
Extremely Worried

4. Given what you know about agroterrorism, are you worried that your facility may be the
target of an agroterrorist attack?
1

2

3

Not At All Worried

4

5
Extremely Worried
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5. Has this facility ever been evaluated for security risks?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

skip to Question 7
proceed to Question 6
proceed to Question 6

6. Are you interested in undergoing evaluation for security risks?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

78

Section 3: Outside Security Measures
The following ten sections are designed to assess security implementations in Kentucky meat
processing facilities. They will be used to document trends in security strengths and
vulnerabilities in facilities across Kentucky. They are not designed for me to identify strengths
and weaknesses at individual facilities, however, you may use them for that purpose if you wish.
I would be happy to provide more information about USDA food defense recommendations upon
request. Contact information for me, my research advisor, and the Institutional Review Board
will be provided to you.
7. Is there a perimeter fence that encloses the entire facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

8. Are surveillance cameras used in this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

9. Are all entrances locked and secured during non-working hours?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 10
skip to Question 11
skip to Question 11

10. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?

11. Are windows and air vents locked and secured?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 12
skip to Question 13
skip to Question 13

12. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?
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13. Are there any outdoor animal or meat storage facilities?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 14
skip to Question 17
skip to Question 17

14. Is access to these facilities controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

15. Are the entrances to these facilities locked and secured during non-working hours?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 16
skip to Question 17
skip to Question 17

16. How do you ensure they are locked?

17. Are there any alarm systems in place to detect unauthorized entry?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 18
skip to Question 20
skip to Question 20

18. Are these regularly maintained and updated according to manufacturer instructions?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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19. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly?

20. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized entry? Please
describe.
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Section 4: Shipment Security
21. Are incoming packages examined for evidence of tampering?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

22. Are outgoing packages examined for evidence of tampering?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

23. What is the procedure if tampering is suspected?

24. Are incoming vehicles examined before entrance to the facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

25. Are outgoing vehicles examined before exiting the facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

26. Is there a loading dock at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 27
skip to Question 29
skip to Question 29

27. If so, are loading and unloading secured or monitored?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 28
skip to Question 29
skip to Question 29
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28. How is loading and unloading secured or monitored?

29. Are there any other security measures in place regarding incoming and outgoing
shipments?
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Section 5: Mail Security
30. Is mail handling done away from any animal or meat processing activities or from any
ingredients used at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

31. Is mail examined for suspicious-looking envelopes?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

32. Are employees trained to look for suspicious mail?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

33. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?
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Section 6: Indoor Security Measures
34. Are restricted areas of the facility clearly marked and secured?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

35. Are new materials or previously unused materials examined before use in the facility?
Materials may include any new ingredients, animal feed, cleaning supplies, etc. that are
purchased for use in this facility.
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

36. Is inventory documented?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
37. How often is inventory updated, e.g. once a week, once a month, etc?

38. If unexpected changes in inventory occur, are they reported to appropriate authorities?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

39. Is emergency lighting present in this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

40. Are there emergency exit policies in place for this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 41
skip to Question 44
skip to Question 44
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41. Are employees aware of the emergency exit policies?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

42. Are employees periodically drilled on where to go in the event of an emergency?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

43. Are emergency response personnel, such as police or fire departments, aware of the
emergency exit policies?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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Section 7: Slaughter/Processing Area Security
44. Are live animals stored at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 45
skip to Question 68
skip to Question 68

45. Are animals in this facility inspected by a federal, state, or local veterinarian?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

46. Are animals screened for abnormal behavior that may indicate the presence of disease?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

47. What is the procedure in place when a diseased animal is discovered? Please answer the
following:
a. What institutions (CDC, USDA, FDA, state or local government), if any, are
alerted when the animal is discovered?

b. Is the diseased animal slaughtered?

Yes

No

I don’t know

c. Is the animal or animal carcass sent for testing?

Yes

No

I don’t know

d. Are other animals in this facility quarantined and tested? Yes
know
e. Are there any other procedures you would like to mention?

48. Is access to animals in this facility controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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No

I don’t

49. Are records maintained of who entered and exited animal storage areas?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

50. Are records maintained for every animal stored at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 51
skip to Question 53
skip to Question 53

51. Do the records include where the animal was purchased from?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

52. Do the records include when the animal was purchased?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

53. Are purchase receipts maintained onsite for animals stored in this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 54
skip to Question 55
skip to Question 55

54. For how long are these receipts kept at this facility?
_________________________________

55. Are visitors allowed access to animal storage facilities?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 56
skip to Question 58
skip to Question 58
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56. Are visitors required to sign in?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
57. Are visitors accompanied by appropriate personnel at all times?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

58. Is animal slaughtering performed at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 59
skip to Question 68
skip to Question 68

59. Is access to the slaughtering area controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

60. Are records maintained of who entered and exited the slaughtering area?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

61. Are records maintained regarding which animals are slaughtered?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

62. Are records maintained regarding when each animal was slaughtered?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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63. Is periodic testing on slaughtered animals done in order to detect the presence of
diseases?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 64
skip to Question 65
skip to Question 65

64. Are visitors ever allowed access to the slaughtering facilities?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 62
skip to Question 68
skip to Question 68

65. Are visitors to the slaughtering facility required to sign in?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

66. Are visitors to the slaughtering facility accompanied by appropriate personnel at all
times?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

67. Is access to equipment used for animal handling controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

68. Are meat products stored at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 69
skip to Question 72
skip to Question 72

69. Is access to meat products controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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70. Are inventory records regarding the date of storage of meat products available?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

71. Is periodic testing performed on meat products to detect disease and ensure quality?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

72. Are ingredients or products other than meat, used in food meant for animal or human
consumption, stored here?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 73
skip to Question 78
skip to Question 78

73. Is access to these products controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

74. Are inventory records regarding the company these ingredients were purchased from
available?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
75. Are inventory records regarding the date of purchase of these ingredients available?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

76. Are inventory records regarding the date of storage of these ingredients available?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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76. Is periodic examination of the ingredients performed to check for evidence of
tampering?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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Section 8: Water System Security
78. Are storage tanks of potable water used in this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 79
skip to Question 82
skip to Question 82

79. Is access to the water tanks controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

80. Are the water tanks monitored for evidence of tampering?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

81. Is periodic quality testing performed on the water in these tanks?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

82. Is a water reuse system in place at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 83
skip to Question 85
skip to Question 85

83. Is access to the water reuse system controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

84. Is the water reuse system monitored for evidence of tampering?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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85. Are transfer lines employed to move water or ingredients used in animal or human food
consumption?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 86
skip to Question 88
skip to Question 88

86. Is access to the transfer lines controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

87. Are the transfer lines periodically examined for evidence of tampering?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

88. Is ice-making equipment in use at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 89
skip to Question 90
skip to Question 90

89. Is access to the ice-making equipment controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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Section 9: Hazardous Material Security
90. Are any hazardous materials stored at this facility in bulk quantities? These may
include cleaning materials, laboratory materials, or sanitizers.
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 91
skip to Question 94
skip to Question 94

91. Is access to stored hazardous materials controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

92. Is an inventory of all hazardous materials stored at this facility on file?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 93
skip to Question 94
skip to Question 94

93. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory of hazardous
materials?

94. Is all hazardous waste at this facility disposed of properly according to appropriate
federal guidelines?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

95. Is access to hazardous waste controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

95

Section 10: Information Security
96. Is access to information regarding facility layout controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

97. Is access to information regarding facility processing controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

98. Is access to any inventory documents kept at this facility controlled and/or restricted?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

99. Is a computer system in use at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 100
skip to Question 103
skip to Question 103

100. Is a password required for access to the computer system?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

101. Is a firewall in place to protect the computer system?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

102. Is virus protection software used to protect the computer system?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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Section 11: Employee/Non-employee Security
103. Are employees required to wear identification materials, such as badges or name tags?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

104. Are employees required to sign in and out at the beginning and end of their work
period?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

105. Are new employees required to undergo background checks before beginning work at
this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

106. Are employees restricted from taking cameras, or cell phones with cameras, on to this
facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

107. Are employees required to undergo security or awareness training at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

skip to Question 109
proceed to Question 108
proceed to Question 108

108. Are you interested in providing security or awareness training for your employees?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

109. Is information available for employees on the policies for responding to threats?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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110. Are employees required to report suspicious activity or unidentified individuals at this
facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 111
skip to Question 112
skip to Question 112

111. Are employee reports investigated at the time of submission?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

112. Are visitors required to sign in when entering restricted areas of this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

113. Are visitors required to wear identification materials, such as badges or name tags
when entering restricted areas of this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

114. Are visitors restricted from taking cameras, or cell phones with cameras, on to
restricted areas of this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know
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Section 12: Incident Response
115. Are there procedures in place at this facility to quarantine products suspected of being
tampered with?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

116. Is a food recall plan in place at this facility?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

proceed to Question 117
skip to Question 118
skip to Question 118

117. Has the food recall plan undergone testing?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

118. Are all emergency and personnel contact information kept up to date?
О Yes
О No
О I don’t know

This is the end of the survey. Thank you for taking the time to respond.
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN STUDY OF FOOD SERVICE
ESTABLISHMENTS

Project Title: Food Security Protocols Utilized in Meat Processing and Food
Service Establishments in Kentucky
Investigator: Morgan Webb-Yeates, Western Kentucky University
Department of Physics and Astronomy, 937-657-8108
Research Advisor: Dr. Vijay Golla, Western Kentucky University
Department of Public Health, 270-745-2448

Questionnaire for Food Service Establishments
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Section 1: Descriptive Statistics

This section is used for analysis purposes only.
D1. How would you describe this food service establishment?
О
Chain Restaurant
О
Non-Chain Restaurant
О
School/Child Day Care Cafeteria
О
Hospital/Long-term Care Cafeteria
О
Hotel/Bed and Breakfast
О
Other
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Section 2: Terrorism and Food Defense
1. Bioterrorism is defined by the Department of Homeland Security as “the
intentional release of a pathogen or biotoxin against humans, plants, or animals.”
How familiar are you with the concept of “bioterrorism”?
1
Completely Unfamiliar

2

3

4

Somewhat Unfamiliar

Somewhat Familiar

Completely Familiar

2. How concerned are you about a bioterrorism attack occurring against the United
States?
1

2

3

4

Not At All Concerned

5
Extremely Concerned

3. Food tampering is related to bioterrorism. Food tampering is defined as the
deliberate contamination of food products with the intent to cause harm. How
concerned are you about an incident of food tampering occurring in the United
States?
1

2

Completely Unfamiliar

3

Somewhat Unfamiliar

4

Somewhat Familiar

Completely Familiar

4. How concerned are you about an incident of food tampering occurring in your
establishment?
1

2

3

Not At All Concerned

4

5
Extremely Concerned
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5. Food defense is defined by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
as “protecting the food supply from intentional contamination…by people that want
to do us harm.” How concerned are you with food defense in your establishment?
1

2

3

4

Not At All Concerned

5
Extremely Concerned

6. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) publishes a Guidance Document for
Retail Food Stores and Food Establishments with information and voluntary
recommendations regarding food defense. Are you familiar with this document?
1

2

Completely Unfamiliar

3

Somewhat Unfamiliar

Somewhat Familiar

7. Are you interested in reviewing this document?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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4
Completely Familiar

Section 3: Management Responsibilities in Food Defense
8. Is there a food defense plan in place at this establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 9
skip to Question 11
skip to Question 11

9. Are all employees at this establishment familiar with this plan?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

10. Has this plan been exercised within the last year?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

11. Are periodic security inspections of the establishment conducted by a manager
or designated member of the staff?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

12. Are management employees familiar with 24-hour contact information for
federal, state, and local (if available):
•

Police

Yes

No

I don’t know

•

Fire

Yes

No

I don’t know

•

Ambulance

Yes

No

I don’t know

•

Public Health Department Yes

No

I don’t know

•

Homeland Security Agency Yes

No

I don’t know
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13. Food tampering is the deliberate introduction of a contaminant to a food
product. Are staff members encouraged to be vigilant about food tampering?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

14. Are staff members aware of whom they should report a suspected tampering
incident to?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

15. Are staff reports of food tampering investigated immediately by an appropriate
authority?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

16. Is a manager or designated “person in charge” present at all hours of operation?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

17. Are managers trained to restrict/exclude employees that are experiencing
symptoms of foodborne illness, as required by law?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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Section 4: Staff Responsibilities in Food Defense
18. Are new employees required to undergo a background check before being hired
at this establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

19. Are employees required to wear name tags to identify them during their shift?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

20. Are employees required to wear uniforms to identify them during their shift?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

21. Are name tags, uniforms, or other means of identifying employees collected
when an employee no longer works at this establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

22. Is documentation available for which employees are working in this
establishment at any given time?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

23. Are restricted areas of this establishment clearly marked?
О
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
Not Applicable
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24. Is access to restricted areas granted only to those employees who require access
to perform their job duties?
О
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
Not Applicable

25. Are employees required to undergo security training at this establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

26. Is information available for employees on the policies for responding to threats?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

27. Are employees required to report any activity they feel is suspicious? Suspicious
activities may include unauthorized access to restricted areas or suspected
tampering of food products.
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

28. Is monitoring for unusual activity in staff members conducted by this
establishment? Unusual activity may include: arriving unusually early or staying
unusually late without an appropriate excuse, accessing restricted documents,
removing documents from the facility, or bringing cameras to work.
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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29. Are employees trained to recognize symptoms of foodborne illness?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

30. Are employees trained to report if they, or other employees, are experiencing
symptoms of foodborne illness?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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Section 5: Customer/Visitor Security
31. Are customers restricted from entering food preparation areas of this
establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

32. Visitors to the establishment are those that are present in an official capacity,
including but not limited to delivery staff, health inspectors, contractors, or sales
representatives. Are visitors required to show proper identification before being
admitted to restricted areas?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

33. Are visitors required to show documentation as to the purpose of their visit?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

34. Are visitors required to sign in before entering restricted areas?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

35. Are visitor access records maintained in this establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

36. Are visitors accompanied at all times when present in restricted areas?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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Section 6: Outdoor/Indoor Security
37. Are all entrances locked and secured during non-working hours?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 37
skip to Question 39
skip to Question 39

38. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?

39. Are windows and air vents locked and secured?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 40
skip to Question 41
skip to Question 41

40. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?

41. Are surveillance cameras used to monitor suspicious activity inside the
establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

42. Are surveillance cameras used to monitor suspicious activity outside the
establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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43. Are there any alarm systems in place to detect unauthorized entry?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 44
skip to Question 46
skip to Question 46

44. Are these regularly maintained and updated according to manufacturer
instructions?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

45. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly?

46. Are there any outdoor storage facilities?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 47
skip to Question 50
skip to Question 50

47. Is access to these facilities controlled and/or restricted?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

48. Are the entrances to these facilities locked and secured during non-working
hours?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 49
skip to Question 50
skip to Question 50
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49. How do you ensure they are locked?

50. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized entry? Please
describe.
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Section 7: Food Security
51. Is food delivered to this establishment by approved outside sources?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

52. Is food that is delivered to this establishment inspected by employees for
evidence of tampering?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

53. What is this establishment’s policy for receiving unexpected food in a delivery?

54. Is an inventory maintained of all foods present in the establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

55. Does this inventory contain records for:
•

What foods have been delivered

•

No

I don’t know

Where delivered foods have been purchased from
know

Yes

No

•

When foods are stored

Yes

No

I don’t know

•

Where foods are stored

Yes

No

I don’t know

•

Expiration dates of stored food

Yes

No

I don’t know
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Yes

I don’t

56. How often is inventory updated, i.e. once a week, once a month, etc?

57. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory
records?

58. Are all foods stored in this establishment labeled?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

59. What is the policy at this establishment when unlabeled food is discovered?

60. Are stored foods inspected by employees before use?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

61. Are all foods stored according to the time/temperature controls required by the
FDA?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

62. Are all foods prepared according to the time/temperature controls required by
the FDA?
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О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

63. Are potentially contaminated foods stored separately from usable foods?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

64. Are foods suspected of contamination sent away for laboratory testing?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

65. Are expired or uneaten foods discarded according to FDA guidelines?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

66. Is equipment used for food preparation cleaned before use with another type of
food?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

67. Are different types of foods stored separately? For example, are meat products
kept separate from produce?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

68. Are commonly used food products stored in bulk placed in easily-monitored
public areas? These products may include herbs, spices, oils, coffee grounds, salt,
pepper, flour, sugar, baking soda/powder, etc.
О

Yes
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О
О

No
I don’t know

69. Is all produce washed according to FDA guidelines?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

70. Self-service areas are areas where customers are allowed to serve themselves
food products. Buffets and salad bars are examples of self-service areas. Are selfservice areas used in this establishment?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 71
skip to Question 72
skip to Question 72

71. Are self-service areas constantly monitored for tampering activity?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

72. Are vending machines used in this facility?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 73
skip to Question 74
skip to Question 74

73. Is access to vending machine products restricted to authorized personnel?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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Section 8: Mail Security
74. Is mail handling done away from any animal or meat processing activities or
from any ingredients used at this facility?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

75. Is mail examined for suspicious-looking envelopes?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

76. Are employees trained to look for suspicious mail?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

77. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?
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Section 9: Hazardous Materials
78. Are any hazardous materials stored at this establishment in bulk quantities?
These may include cleaning materials or sanitizers.
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 79
skip to Question 82
skip to Question 82

79. Is access to stored hazardous materials controlled and/or restricted?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

80. Is an inventory of all hazardous materials stored at this establishment on file?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 81
skip to Question 82
skip to Question 82

81. What is the procedure for any inconsistency discovered in the inventory of
hazardous materials?

82. Is all hazardous waste at this facility disposed of properly according to
appropriate federal guidelines?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

83. Is access to hazardous waste controlled and/or restricted?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know
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Section 10: Information Security
84. Is access to any inventory documents kept at this facility controlled and/or
restricted?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

85. Is a computer system in use at this facility?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

proceed to Question 86
skip to End
skip to End

86. Is a password required for access to the computer system?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

87. Is a firewall in place to protect the computer system?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

88. Is virus protection software used to protect the computer system?
О
О
О

Yes
No
I don’t know

This is the end of the survey. Thank you for taking the time to respond. If you would
like to participate in the iPod Touch give-away drawing, please email your name,
address, and phone number to Morgan Webb-Yeates. Contact information for Morgan is
provided below. Feel free to contact Morgan with regards to any questions you may have
about this research.
Morgan Webb-Yeates, MPH
Western Kentucky University Department of Physics and Astronomy
Cell: 937-657-8108
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Work: 270-781-8039 Ext. 122
Email: morgan.webb-yeates872@topper.wku.edu
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF RESPONSES FROM FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS-MEAT
PROCESSORS
10. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?
1) “staff responsible”
2) “two walkthroughs by employee, management”
3) “padlocks, regular locks on doors”
4) “phisical (sic) check”
5) “alarm system”
12. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?
1) “Vents are locked inside building. There are no windows at this facility”
2) “constantly locked”
3) “have locks on them”
4) “check on daily basis”
5) “phisical (sic) check”
6) “they were constructed that way & we have motion detectors on our alarm”
7) “there (sic) bolted”
16. How do you ensure they (entrances to outdoor animal or meat storage) are
locked?
1) “check”
19. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly?
1) “6 Months”
2) “Everyday”
3) “once a year”
4) “Daily”
20. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized
entry? Please describe.
1) “No”
2) “We are a fairly small operation where all the employees know one another,
someone whose is not employeed (sic) by us is obvious to the workers here”
3) “N/A”
4) “Payed security guard in house outside facility. Police circle frequently”
5) “N/A”
6) “No”
7) “No”
8) “police drive by”
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23. What is the procedure if tampering is suspected?
1) “The outbound are samples headed for labs, they have a special tape and are taken
directly to shipment”
2) “Ask employees if anyone noticed anything. If find something an intruder had
done, would call authorities”
3) “Pull it aside, retain the product”
4) “visual”
5) “Incoming package are rejected outgoing are held & examined”
6) “Product is examined and a decision is made to properly discard”
7) “Never had problem”
8) “hold for management”
28. How is loading and unloading secured or monitored?
1) “The dock area is headed up by a owner of the business, he knows all people who
work at facility”
2) “All loading & unloading is approved and monitored by our employees”
3) “Troopers meat truck backs up to front door & meat is wheeled in under our
inspector”
29. Are there any other security measures in place regarding incoming and
outgoing shipments?
1) “Incoming shipments have scales that must be checked before accepting the
product. Outgoing shipments are held inside overhang until drivers arrive to leave
for the day.”
2) “examination”
3) “retain products for testing before shipped, testing products”
4) “No-just visual inspection”
5) “No”
6) “No”
7) “No”
33. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?
1) “None. Never had that problem”
2) “N/A”
3) “call sheriff”
4) “We throw it away or call authorities”
5) “Management takes care of mail”
47a. What institutions (CDC, USDA, FDA, state or local government), if any, are
alerted when the animal is discovered?
1) “Federal inspector observes before slaughter; sheriff”
2) “district office of USDA – federal office of USDA”
3) “FSIS, USDA”
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47e. Are there any other procedures you would like to mention?
1) “N/A”
2) “’suspect animals’ – has a puncture mark, goes into freezer locked by USDA until
testing can occur”
3) “N/A”
93. What is the procedure for any inconsistencies discovered in the inventory of
hazardous materials?
1) “none”
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APPENDIX E: LIST OF RESPONSES FROM FREE RESPONSE QUESTIONS-FOOD
SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS
38. How do you ensure that the entrances are locked?
1. “double check doors”
2. “Have signs posted to keep doors locked at all times”
3. “locked with keys, set alarm”
4. “Door locks, check list, mgt”
5. “We lock them”
6. “I am responsible for door #3. for example and certain people are responsible for
a area.”
7. “With a key & alarm”
8. “Manager locks them”
9. “yes”
10. “locking them and checking before leaving”
11. “shut doors”
12. “Checked by management”
13. “Lock”
14. “At all times”
15. “-Alarm is set & doors are check; - Also all doors must have to have a key to get
in”
16. “We are required to have someone in kitchen at all times. All other doors are
controlled by electronic code keypads”
17. “pull door shut thrght (sic)”
18. “Periodic checks conducted”
19. “Check them myself”
20. “We all have a code that we have to use going & coming”
21. “Alarm”
22. “When locked doors are pulled on to make sure they have properly latched.”
23. “Check locks twice”
24. “lock doors, double check when closed”
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40. How do you ensure that windows and air vents are secure?
1. “Solid windows vents on roof duct to (sic) small for person to enter”
2. “inaccessible”
3. “windows don’t open. Air vents locked with screens & vents. Access to Roof
locked with pad⋅lock”
4. “check list, mgt.”
5. “Can’t open”
6. “yes”
7. “The (sic) remain locked/closed”
8. “look at them”
9. “Checked weekly”
10. “Lock them”
11. “Daily”
12. “they get checked once a week”
13. “Lock windows”
14. “Routine checks and maintenance”
15. “Check daily”
16. “Check them”
17. “They are checked daily”
18. “double check”
19. “Windows don’t open”
45. How often do you ensure that the alarm system is working properly?
1. “Weekly”
2. “Every 6 months”
3. “daily, weekly,”
4. “no alarm – camera systems”
5. “Don’t know”
6. “Never”
7. “Monthly”
8. “Daily”
9. “Maintained daily by security staff”
10. “Daily”
11. “Daily”
12. “Every day”
13. “Daily”
14. “Once month”
15. “Every 6 weeks”
16. “Everyday”
17. “At least annually”
18. “Weekly test”
19. “every week”
20. “Monthly”
21. “just started”
22. “monthly”
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49. How do you ensure they (outdoor storage facilities) are locked?
1. “Pad lock. 8ft tall fence”
2. “check list, mgt.”
3. “Locked and always double checked”
4. “Only unlocked by management”
5. “Check every day”
6. “Check before leaving”
7. “they are checked nightly”
8. “Regular manager inspections”
9. “use a key”
10. “Door automatically locks – alarm is set each night and door secured and locked.”
11. “They are checked daily & a code is used”
12. “Lock on outside of the door & cameras are outside as well”
13. “key & lock”
50. Are there any other security measures employed to prevent unauthorized
entry? Please describe.
1. “I don’t know”
2. “No”
3. “all maintenance/services are set to a routine, and service must be requested by
manager, must be signed by management on invoice stating start & finish time
and who preformed (sic) service.”
4. “We have to clear back door before opening.”
5. “No”
6. “No”
7. “We haved (sic) a specially trained security dep. at our facility”
8. “any visitor has to go through front office of school to enter premises.”
9. “Door Cover – Alarm System”
10. “Keypad on door code protected”
11. “Every Entrance is Locked until Opening Business”
12. “no”
13. “-All doors are lock but main entrance during working hours; -cameras; -Alarm
system”
14. “the front doors usually stay unlocked but can be locked internally”
15. “Security cameras”
16. “camaras (sic)and locks.”
17. “Monitored by management.”
18. “Just the codes that we use. no one else knows the codes”
19. “N/A”
20. “no”
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53. What is this establishment’s policy for receiving unexpected food in a
delivery?
1. “N/A”
2. “Sent back”
3. “Return to delivery company”
4. “return it.”
5. “check invoice to insure it was to be delivered here. All things “auto shiped” (sic)
from company we are made aware of befor (sic) hand. Ex. menu change, food
provider change,”
6. “Send it back.”
7. “Call our Supervisor to see if it is a special order.”
8. “I do not get unexpected food in a delivery.”
9. “Send it back”
10. “Decline”
11. “Returning if now quality”
12. “Return”
13. “I.D. Know how manager handles that”
14. “Don’t know”
15. “We have more delivered”
16. “Send it back to supplier”
17. “do not accept – return for credit”
18. “Call & send back”
19. “refuse or discard immediately”
20. “We immediately contact food supplier and separate unexpected food from
normal delivery”
21. “Notification of our corporate office as well as food vendor”
22. “Don’t”
23. “No”
24. “We notify the deliverer & the manager”
25. “Report to manager asap, let them speak to delivery person”
26. “Reject”
27. “I don’t know”

127

57. What is the procedure for an inconsistencies discovered in the inventory
records?
1. “N/A”
2. “Call owners”
3. “I call the company”
4. “talk to central office, make note and corrections”
5. “check product usages/wastes. Keep prep items to a minamum (sic)”
6. “call higher mgt right then”
7. “We would have to look back on History.”
8. “Adjustments”
9. “Search for it”
10. “Tell a manager”
11. “Operation change”
12. “investigated & corrected”
13. “their (sic) is no inconsistencies”
14. “discussions”
15. “documented & tell manager”
16. “go back and recheck. further investigate inventory. check security tapes.”
17. “Audit”
18. “Dispose of it”
19. “We notify the correct people”
20. “not sure.”
21. “small mom & pop. inventory has been pretty good”
22. “Removal”
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59. What is the policy at this establishment when unlabeled food is discovered?
1. “Throw away”
2. “Throw away”
3. “1) check with cook first 2) tell them to put label”
4. “throw out.”
5. “correct the action. Remind all employees the importance of proper labeling.”
6. “Discard”
7. “I (sic) would be dystroyed (sic).”
8. “Trash”
9. “Remove it”
10. “1. verbal warning 2. write up 3. termination”
11. “Trashed”
12. “Label it”
13. “give to manager”
14. “Discarded”
15. “Throw out”
16. “management”
17. “Open or throw away if no date”
18. “discard immediately”
19. “Discard”
20. “to throw away and not use”
21. “Food is opened but not used.”
22. “Discard”
23. “Dispose”
24. “Throw out”
25. “Toss it out”
26. “everything is labeled”
27. “Removal”
28. “Ask”
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77. What is the procedure for handling suspicious mail?
1. “I don’t know”
2. “Report it to authorities”
3. “contact corporate”
4. “call higher mgt.”
5. “Don’t get it here”
6. “Show a manager”
7. “I don’t know”
8. “Don’t know”
9. “Not handling it”
10. “I don’t know”
11. “report to authorities; discard”
12. “None”
13. “Call police”
14. “The (sic) notify the correct authorities”
15. “Call security”
16. “Opened mail anything on mail”
17. “employees do not handle the mail”
81. What is the procedure for any inconsistency discovered in the inventory of
hazardous materials?
1. “find out why”
2. “talk to central office, make note and corrections”
3. “all access is approved By management we hand out what is needed.”
4. “We would contact our prinicple (sic) & my supervisor”
5. “I don’t inventory our chemicals, they would only be delime for the lime in the
dishwasher”
6. “n/a”
7. “Investigate & correct”
8. “same as food”
9. “Audit”
10. “Dispose”
11. “We notify the correct authorities”
12. “Report to manager asap”
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